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ABSTRACT 
 This project, overall, involves a theory of law as dimensions.  Throughout the history of 
the study of law, many different theoretical paradigms have emerged proffering different and 
competing ways to answer the question ‘what is law’?  Traditionally, many of these paradigms 
have been at irreconcilable odds with one another.  Notwithstanding this seeming reality, the 
goal of this project was to attempt to take three of the leading paradigms in legal theory and 
provide a way to explain how each might fit into a single coherent theory of law.  I set out to 
accomplish this by drawing on the field of theoretical physics and that field’s use of spatial 
dimensions in explaining various physical phenomena.  By engaging in a dimensional analysis of 
law, I found that I was able to place each paradigm within its own dimension with that dimension 
being defined by a specific element of time, and in doing so much of the conflict between the 
paradigms came to be ameliorated.   
 The project has been divided into two main parts.  PART I discusses the fundamentals of 
legal theory (Chapter 1) and the fundamentals of dimensions (Chapter 2).  These fundamentals 
provide a foundation for a dimensional analysis of law which takes place throughout PART II.  
In Chapter 3, I argue that the three fundamental theses of Positivism coalesce with the 1
st
-
dimension of law, which is defined as law as it exists at any one point in time.  From there, I 
argue in Chapter 4 that the 2
nd
-dimension of law, being law as it exists between two points in 
time (i.e. when cases are adjudicated), is characterized by Pragmatism.  I then turn, in Chapter 5, 
to argue that the 3
rd
-dimension of law, being law as it exists from the very first point in legal time 
to the ever changing present day, coalesces with the fundamental theses of Naturalism.  
Ultimately then, I argue that a theory of law as dimensions, through the vantage points of the 
specific elements of time, provides a more complete account of the nature of law.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more … 
 
William Shakespeare 
Henry V, Act III 
 
 
 
 The words above, written by Shakespeare in Act III of his Henry V, are part and parcel of 
what is considered one of Shakespeare’s greatest speeches.  The words are a passionate plea by 
King Henry V to his soldiers to once again thrust themselves into the foray of war.  The words 
that follow these are eloquent and bring about visions of military zeal and intense struggle.  But 
notwithstanding the intensity of the struggle, it is understood that it was a noble struggle for a 
noble cause, an analogy I hope holds some weight with the current project.  While the analogy is 
a loose one, and one that admittedly risks edging upon hyperbole, in my view it is an 
appropriately fitting one in context, especially with respect to dispute and conflict within legal 
theory and amongst legal theorists.  It may be stated that the discipline of legal theory shares a 
somewhat similar struggle, with legal theorists from all over the world entering the foray of 
theoretical dispute by jostling, arguing, and advocating zealously their views with respect to the 
nature of law.  Many of these theorists have successfully built upon through expanded reason, 
and also tore down through formidable critique, the work of other notable and established 
theorists that came before them.  Their projects have brought about enlightenment and 
progressing clarity, two objectives that any philosophically inclined individual will hold dear.  
Unfortunately, however, there is a by-product of the foray that is less romantic and even less 
productive, with that by-product being increased theoretical dissonance.   
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Now, it is natural that amongst an environment of dispute there will be critique, but when 
any one critique is unfounded or misplaced, the result is needless theoretical dissonance.  In fact, 
entire schools of theoretical thought have been established via critique of other schools of 
thought, even though there may be well placed doubts as to the very critiques that found the new 
schools.  Notwithstanding all that, there remains an important question as to whether the by-
product of dissonance is unavoidable, and if it is not, whether it would be of value to engage in a 
project that aims to rid disciplines such as legal theory and jurisprudence of that dissonance.  Or, 
put another way, would it be of value to attempt a project whose aim it is to reconcile competing 
theoretical paradigms, by harvesting their merits while at the same time attempting to remedy 
their deficiencies, in an overall effort to establish a more unified theory of law.   
The question of whether the by-product of theoretical dissonance is unavoidable is, I 
think, simple to answer.  No.  There is much value in conventional theory and an important tool 
of conventional theory is critique; however, it is sometimes only once a critique is aired that it 
attracts additional commentary which proves it to be either sufficiently grounded or ultimately 
faulty.  That said, for the time that the critique is neither grounded nor found faulty, it is possible 
(and even probable) that it will act as a catalyst for further commentary.  That further 
commentary will catalyze even further commentary, and so on.  The result is a body of critique, 
expanding exponentially, that has potential to blossom into an entire (new) school of thought – a 
new theoretical paradigm found within the parent theoretical discipline.  As foretold, while the 
new paradigm may be built upon a questionable foundation, this does not detract from the value 
of the venture.  For if/when the foundation is ultimately grounded, the work of the theorists that 
contributed to the paradigm will be celebrated as useful.  But, if it is never, or only briefly, 
celebrated because the foundation is found to be faulty, the value of the venture will be in the 
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pursuit itself, i.e. the pursuit of enlightenment and progressing clarity of the discipline in 
question.  So, not only is the by-product of dissonance unavoidable, but it should not be seen as 
something that is destructive because it is actually a necessary by-product of theoretical progress. 
The other, somewhat related, question of whether the pursuit of a more unified theory of 
law is valuable in and of itself is more difficult to answer, and I will leave it to be answered by 
those who choose to read and critique this project.  For it is my overall aim in this project to take 
steps towards a more unified theory of law by analyzing three of what I consider to be the main 
theoretical paradigms in legal theory and their natural attachments to what I call time-based 
dimensions.  Perhaps this project will ground a foundation for further work towards a unified 
theory; perhaps not.  In the end, it will be the critiques, if any, that will be telling in this regard.   
But before there may be critique, there must first be a project.  The overall structure of 
this project takes the form of five chapters spread over two separate, yet related, parts, with each 
chapter and part building upon the others towards the culmination of a theory of law as 
dimensions.  I begin in PART I which consists of two chapters.  In Chapter 1, I offer a brief 
outline of the fundamentals of legal theory and the nature of law, keeping my focus squarely on 
the more conventional theoretical paradigms, those being Positive Law, Natural Law, and 
Pragmatist theory.  I then turn, in Chapter 2, to explain how one may benefit from 
conceptualizing the nature of law through specific vantage points, which I will describe as law’s 
‘dimensions’.  My aim for Chapters 1 and 2 is to lay the foundations for a dimensional analysis 
of the nature of law, an analysis that will be unpacked in PART II of this project, which consists 
of Chapters 3 through 5.  In Chapter 3, I argue that Positive Law theory best explains the 1
st
-
dimension of law, being law as it exists at any one point in time.  In Chapter 4, I argue that 
Pragmatist theory best explains the 2
nd
-dimension of law, being law as it exists while moving 
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between two points in time.  And finally, in Chapter 5, I argue that Natural Law theory best 
explains the 3
rd
-dimension of law, being law as it exists from the very beginning of law to the 
ever changing present day.   
 
I. Key Themes  
Before moving forward to PART I, more should be said at this point about legal theory, 
the nature of law, and this project.  In particular, it will be useful to outline two key themes that 
run throughout this project.  The first key theme has its roots in perspective.  Perspective, in my 
view, is key to understanding dissonance in legal theory and is a useful tool in helping one 
understand and more fully grasp the nature of law.  So as my arguments throughout this project 
progress, it is my aim to tease out the importance of perspective as a key underlying theme. 
The second key theme that underlies this project is a concept I call the purification 
process, which is a process grounded in notions of justice and morality.  Indeed, this concept is 
pivotal to understanding the progression of law, and thus two out of the three dimensions of law.  
This concept, however, and especially its link to morality, must be sufficiently limited in scope 
and the limits should be defined from the outset of the project.  It is not my intent to proffer any 
sort of in-depth theory of morality or justice per se,
1
 but instead to draw attention to the 
concepts, as Rawls would say, at a higher level of abstraction.
2
  Therefore, and with this in mind, 
one should note that any argumentation pertaining to what justice or morality exactly is, 
including advanced theorizing in this regard, is simply beyond the scope of this project and thus 
                                                 
1
 For two thought provoking accounts of the nature of justice, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised ed 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press , 1999) [Rawls] and Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).  For a recent and important discussion of morality from one of the most 
celebrated legal and moral theorists of modern times, see the late Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
2
 Supra at 10. 
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best left to be developed elsewhere.  That said, I do hope it becomes clear as my arguments 
progress that any further argumentation pertaining to the concept of justice is not needed in order 
to fully grasp the power of law as dimensions. 
 
II. Three Questions 
To give additional aim to this project and help tease out the power of a theory of law as 
dimensions, it will also be useful before moving further to posit a few questions that provide 
some orientation.  Over the course of this project, as the theory of law as dimensions is more 
fully developed, the questions will come to be answered.  There are three main questions, each 
fundamental to legal theory in its own way.  Firstly, the main and most important question to 
ponder is ‘what is law’?  For conceptual purposes, this shall be labelled the Primary Question.  
The Primary Question is one that informs the discipline of legal theory itself.  Plainly, it is the 
overarching question that all general legal theorists hope to assist in answering in some 
significant way through their various works.  In approaching an answer to this question, it is 
prudent to also consider what theoretical effect the distinction between ‘what law is’ and ‘what 
law ought to be’ may happen to bear.  Or, and more to the point, in answering the Primary 
Question, it is helpful to posit a subsidiary question, that being whether it is possible to reconcile 
the distinction between what law is and what law ought to be, and if it is so possible, what effect 
this might have on the nature of law.  This question shall be labelled the Subsidiary Question, as 
it is subsidiary to the Primary Question.  The answer to the Subsidiary Question is ‘yes’ when 
one (properly) conceptualizes law as the constant and consistent pursuit of what law ought to be.  
As well, it should be noted that the answer to the Subsidiary Question doubles as the answer to 
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the Primary Question, i.e. the question ‘what is law’ is most appropriately responded to with the 
answer that law is the constant and consistent pursuit of what law ought to be. 
The second question to ask is whether there is any relationship between laws that are and 
laws that ought to be, and if there is such a connection, what does it entail?  This shall be labelled 
the Secondary Question.  I will argue that there is such a relationship and that it may be 
explained as follows.  Whenever there exists a law that is deficient in some sense, legitimate 
claims may be made as to what that law ought to be.  When and if those claims are heeded, and 
the law is changed such that the law that ought to be is now the law that is, and also such that no 
further legitimate claim may be made as to what that law now ought to be, then one may 
rightfully conclude that the law is pure or just in a moral sense and therefore wholly moral. 
Finally, the third question to ask is whether law has any necessary connection to morality, 
and if so, what that connection entails.  For conceptual purposes, this shall be labelled the 
Tertiary Question, and like the Primary Question, the Tertiary Question has been the concern of 
much theoretical thought and has resulted in the dispensing of much ink to paper.
3
  While some 
have answered it with ‘yes’ and others with ‘no’, and others still with ‘it depends’, I will argue 
that the answer to the question when viewing law as dimensions is both yes and no.  What will 
                                                 
3
 See e.g. HLA Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” (1958) 71 Harv L Rev 593 [Hart-
Positivism], Lon L Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart” (1958) 71 Harv L Rev 630 
[Fuller-Fidelity], Tony Honoré, “The Necessary Connection between Law and Morality” (2002) 22 Oxford J Legal 
Stud 489, and Klaus Faber, “Farewell to ‘Legal Positivism’: The Separation Thesis Unraveling” in Robert P George 
ed, The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1996).  But see John Gardner, 
Law as a Leap of Faith, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012) [Gardner] – in a Chapter based on a previous 
article which he had written titled “Legal Positivism: 5 ½ Myths” (2001) 46 Am J Juris 199, Gardner beginning at 
page 48 of his book argues that the thesis that law has no necessary connection to morality is ‘absurd’ and has never 
been endorsed by any legal philosopher, and he concludes by finding that the claim is one of the 5 ½ myths that 
individuals have incorrectly attributed to Legal Positivism.  That said, he does seem to concede that Hart may have 
held this view in his early work, although Gardner ultimately argues that this had to be based on a mistaken reading 
by Hart of Bentham and Austin.  Now, while Gardner’s argument in this regard is debatable, mostly because of the 
way he chooses to frame the no necessary connection thesis, I note that he grounds the argument on the (correct) 
notion that the ‘paradigm’ of Legal Positivism is simply a thesis and not a complete theory of the nature of law.  
More will be said on this in Chapter 3. 
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become clear through a dimensional analysis of law is that the nature of law is such that it both 
does and does not have a necessary connection to morality.  This conclusion may be labelled the 
law/morality paradox, or the Paradox, with the solution to the Paradox being born from a proper 
understanding of Law as Dimensions. 
 
III. Summarizing the Three Questions 
As a summary then, and as a sort of chart that is indicative of what is to come, the three 
questions and the subsidiary question, and the solutions to those questions including the Paradox 
which is derived therefrom, take the following forms: 
 
 
Primary Question:  What is law? 
Subsidiary Question:   Can one reconcile the distinction between ‘what law is’ and 
‘what law ought to be’? 
 
Solution: The Subsidiary Question may be answered in the 
affirmative if one responds to the Primary Question with 
the answer that law is the constant and consistent pursuit of 
what law ought to be. 
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Secondary Question: What is the relationship, if any, between a law that ‘is’ and 
the law that ‘ought to be’? 
 
Solution: When a law that ought to be is made to become a law that 
is, it may be said that the law is now pure or just in a moral 
sense and that the law is thus wholly moral. 
 
 
Tertiary Question: Does law have a necessary connection to morality, and if 
so, what is that connection? 
 
The Paradox: Law both does and does not have a necessary connection to 
morality. 
 
Solution to the Paradox: Law as Dimensions 
 
 
Having posited the above questions and having proffered the preliminary and 
corresponding solutions, it appears that the framework for this project is sufficiently in place.  It 
is thus appropriate to now build upon this introductory framework, beginning with a descriptive 
analysis of some fundamentals of the nature of law, followed by a dimensional analysis of the 
same.  So with the above resonating, I move to discuss the fundamentals.  
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PART I: FUNDAMENTALS  
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Chapter 1: Fundamentals of Legal Theory and the Nature of Law 
 
I think it would be wise at the commencement of this chapter to proffer the following 
caution.  This chapter is meant only as a very brief introduction to what are considered otherwise 
detailed and nuanced theoretical paradigms.  It follows that the overview given is necessarily 
generalized and admittedly, at times, somewhat overly simplified.  I chose to take this approach 
partially in the interests of brevity, but also in the hopes that it will act to enhance overall clarity.  
My aim at this point is not to argue for or against any particular theoretical paradigm, but instead 
to identify and then generally describe certain theses found amongst the different paradigms that 
I believe prove especially important for the discussions in subsequent chapters.  This is also why 
I have chosen not to characterize this chapter as an ‘introduction to legal theory’, for such would 
be somewhat misleading.  In truth, a thorough introduction to legal theory and the nature of law 
has the potential to span an entire book, and perhaps even more than that.
4
   
Needless to say then, my goal for this chapter is more modest.  I will look to outline some 
of the more prominent theses within two of what I consider to be the more conventional 
theoretical paradigms, Positive Law and Natural Law theory, and will then go on to discuss a 
third theoretical paradigm, Pragmatism, and most prominently pragmatic implications for 
judicial adjudication.  Generally, the theses to be covered and attributed to the three overarching 
paradigms include the ‘Separation Thesis’, the ‘Social Fact Thesis’, the ‘Necessary (Moral) 
                                                 
4
 Many books are instructive in this regard.  For example, and for a more in-depth summary and analysis of legal 
theory and the nature of law that spans many different topics and philosophical issues, see Jules Coleman & Scott 
Shapiro, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2002) [Coleman & Shapiro] and James Penner, David Schiff, & Richard Nobles, eds, Jurisprudence & Legal 
Theory: Commentary and Materials (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005) [Penner et al]. 
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Connection Thesis’, the ‘Right Answer Thesis’, the ‘Best Choice Thesis’, and the ‘Multiple 
Right Answers Thesis’. 
 
1.1 Positive Law Theory 
Positive Law theory, otherwise known as Legal Positivism or Positivism,
5
 is a theoretical 
paradigm which has roots that go back centuries and content that has been subjected to evolution 
and clarification over time.  Yet regardless of any of the various evolutions and clarifications that 
may have taken place, Positivism as a whole remains grounded in a number of fundamental 
theses.
6
  For the purposes of this project, three of the theses will prove especially important, and 
they are known as: the Social Fact Thesis; the Social Source Thesis or Sources Thesis; and the 
Separation Thesis.
7
  While these theses may take on somewhat different forms depending on the 
sub-category of Positivism, general statements may still be made about them. 
                                                 
5
 Throughout this project, I use the terms Positive Law Theory, Legal Positivism, and Positivism interchangeably as 
general terms for the entire Positivistic tradition found within legal philosophy.  I may also, as needed, qualify these 
terms depending on the sub-theory that is to be discussed [e.g. Inclusive Positivism or Exclusive Positivism].  
6
 Kenneth E Himma, “Inclusive Legal Positivism” in Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro, eds, The Oxford Handbook of 
Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002) [Himma] at 125 (Himma 
discusses what he considers to be the three foundational “commitments” of legal positivism.  He labels each of these 
three commitments “the Social Fact Thesis, the Conventionality Thesis, and the Separability Thesis”.  In defining 
the three, Himma states, “The Social Fact Thesis asserts that the existence of law is made possible by certain kinds 
of social fact.  The Conventionality Thesis claims that the criteria of validity are conventional in character.  The 
Separability Thesis, at the most general level, denies that there is a necessary overlap between law and morality.”  
While it may be true that each of the three theses is important to the notion of Legal Positivism, I will only discuss 
the first and the third because they have immediate application to the discussion below). 
7
 There is much writing related to these theses.  For an extended discussion in the form of a general overview, see 
generally ibid  at 125-165 and Andrei Marmor, “Exclusive Legal Positivism” in Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro, 
eds, The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002) 
[Marmor] at 104-124.  Other select writings of note include Hart-Positivism supra note 3; HLA Hart, The Concept 
of Law, 3rd ed, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012) [Hart-CL] (The third edition of the CL includes a new 
introduction by Leslie Green who provides, amongst other interesting arguments, a thought provoking update to 
many of Hart’s claims about the various theses); Gardner supra note 3; Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law, 2nd ed, 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009) [Raz-Authority].  
12 
 
The Social Fact Thesis holds as a truism that law is readily identified, and in fact may 
only be identified, based on social fact.
8
  The thesis is directly related to the Sources Thesis, 
which holds, in basic terms, that the criteria for legal validity of any one law is derived from that 
law’s legal source, with that source necessarily being social in nature (for example, the 
legislature of a legal system or, in common law systems, the judges of that legal system).
9
  It 
follows from the Sources Thesis that when a legal source creates law (for example when a 
legislature enacts legislation), the resulting new law and its newfound existence is that of social 
fact, and that law can thus be identified as social fact.  The end result being that the Sources 
Thesis and Social Fact Thesis are interrelated. 
The Separation Thesis, in its strongest sense, holds that law and morality are distinct 
concepts; or put another way, the thesis holds that there need not be any necessary connection 
between law and morality in order for a valid law to exist.
10
  Some additional nuance in this 
regard will prove useful.  Since its beginnings, and in various ways, proponents of Positivism 
                                                 
8
 See e.g. Raz-Authority supra note 7 at 37 (In speaking of the Social Fact and Sources Theses, Raz states that, 
generally speaking, the theses hold that “[w]hat is law and what is not is a matter of social fact…”); cf Marmor 
supra note 7 at 105-116 and Gardner supra note 3 at 19-23. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Wilfred E Rumble, ed, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995) at 157 (John Austin, considered to be one of the founders of Legal Positivism, states in a 
now famous passage that “The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another.  Whether it be or be not 
is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry.  A law, which 
actually exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike it, or though it vary from the text, by which we regulate our 
approbation and disapprobation.”); see Hart-Positivism supra note 4; see Hart-CL supra note 7 (In an attempt to 
define what is meant by the term Legal Positivism, Hart stated that “it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws 
reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so.”  Furthermore, in the 3rd 
edition of Hart’s book, throughout the Postscript, Hart goes into greater detail on his view of the role that moral 
principles play in law and, more specifically, in adjudication as he makes his attempts at responding to the various 
criticisms of his work by Ronald Dworkin.  It is here that Hart formerly endorses ‘soft positivism’ and the 
Incorporation Thesis and, as a result, Inclusive Positivism.  For more on Hart’s Postscript and, in particular, the 
Incorporation Thesis and its relation to Hart’s jurisprudential approach, see Jules Coleman, “Incorporationism, 
Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis” in Jules Coleman, ed, Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the 
Postscript to the Concept of Law (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001) [Coleman].  For commentary on 
Hart’s Postscript from a variety of different angles, see generally Jules Coleman, ed, Hart’s Postscript: Essays on 
the Postscript to the Concept of Law (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001)); But see Gardner supra note 
3 at 48 and my commentary to note 3.    
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have engaged with morality and moral reasoning in helping explain various accounts of the 
nature of law.
11
  But what has not changed is that within the Positivist theses there remains a 
reliance of some sort on the Separation Thesis (e.g. as a necessary corollary to the Social Fact 
and Sources Thesis), and this reliance renders the thesis foundational to Positivism in general.  
From this, one can distill some basic and general doctrine attributable to Legal Positivists.  
Firstly, they believe that the source or pedigree of law is social in nature and that, as a corollary, 
all laws exist as social fact.  Secondly, they believe that morality and/or moral principles do not 
necessarily act as a source of law. 
Now, within the general ambit of Legal Positivism are two main theoretical sub-
paradigms, and from one of these emerged a third that is starting to gain significant support.  The 
first sub-category is known as Inclusive Positivism, which has been endorsed by the likes of 
Jules Coleman, Kenneth Himma, Wil Waluchow, and probably most notably H.L.A. Hart.
12
  The 
second, labeled Exclusive Legal Positivism, has amongst its proponents Andrei Marmor, Scott 
Shapiro, Joseph Raz, and the most recent holder of the eminent Chair of Jurisprudence at the 
                                                 
11
 See e.g. Gardner supra note 3 at 48 (Again, I will provide commentary on the following passage in Chapter 3, but 
for now note): 
Finally, I come to the jurisprudence student’s favourite myth about legal positivism.  Apparently 
legal positivists believe: 
 
(NNC) there is no necessary connection between law and morality. 
 
This thesis is absurd and no legal philosopher of note has ever endorsed it as it stands.  After all, 
there is a necessary connection between law and morality if law and morality are necessarily alike 
in any way.  And of course they are.  If nothing else, they are necessarily alike in both necessarily 
comprising some valid norms.  But there are many other necessary connections between law and 
morality on top of this rather insubstantial one, and legal positivists have often taken great pains to 
assert them.  Hobbes, Bentham, Austin, Kelsen, Hart, Raz, and Coleman all rely on at least some 
more substantial necessary connections between law and morality in explaining various aspects of 
the nature of law (although they do not all rely on the same ones). 
12
 See e.g. Hart-CL supra note 7, Coleman supra note 10, Himma supra note 6, and Wil Waluchow, Inclusive Legal 
Positivism, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
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University of Oxford, John Gardner.
13
  Below, I will begin by discussing certain key aspects of 
each subset before going on to outline the relatively new sub-paradigm of Exclusive Positivism 
advanced by Scott Shapiro.
14
  Shapiro labels his theory the Law as Plans theory, and I will be 
most concerned with the Planning Thesis, for this thesis underlies Shapiro’s more general theory 
of Law as Plans. 
 
1.1.1 Inclusive Positivism 
Inclusive Positivism
15
 is a distinct form of Legal Positivism.  The main features that 
distinguish it from Exclusive Positivism are its interpretation of the Separation Thesis and the 
Sources Thesis.  Inclusive Positivists maintain that there is a separation between law and 
morality, and further maintain that legal norms flow directly from social sources.  Nonetheless, 
their views also allow for an accommodation of morality and moral principles amongst the 
criteria of validity for legal norms (such as, perhaps, during the adjudication of legal disputes).
16
  
The end result is that Inclusive Positivism allows for the possibility that the validity of legal 
norms, at times, may be derived from a moral source such as a moral norm.
17
  This concept is 
more formally referred to as the ‘Incorporation Thesis’ because it recognizes potential ways18 
                                                 
13
 See e.g. Gardner supra note 3, Raz-Authority supra note 7, Scott J Shapiro, Legality, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2011) [Shapiro-Legality], and Marmor supra note 7. 
14
 Shapiro-Legality supra. 
15
 I borrow greatly and gratefully from the work of Kenneth Himma and his essay on Inclusive Legal Positivism 
found in Coleman & Shapiro supra note 1: see generally Himma supra note 6 at 125-65.  Inclusive Legal Positivism 
is known by a variety of different terms, including Inclusive Positivism, Soft Positivism, and Incorporationism: see 
Coleman supra note 10 at 100. 
16
 See Himma supra at 136-50. 
17
 See ibid at 136. 
18
 See ibid at 136-37 (Himma outlines two ways by which a legal norm’s validity may depend upon its moral 
content, and thus two different versions of the Incorporation Thesis.  Firstly, he notes that a system of law could 
have a ‘Sufficiency Component’ whereby in order for a legal norm to be valid, it would be sufficient that the legal 
norm reproduce “the content of some moral principle.”  Secondly, a legal system could have a ‘Necessity 
Component’, whereby in order for a legal norm to be valid it would be necessary for the content of that norm to 
parallel some moral norm or set of moral norms). 
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through which morality may be incorporated into the law.
19
  Therefore, it may be said that while 
Inclusive Positivism generally holds that there may be an intersection or connection between law 
and morality on certain occasions (with respect to legal validity), it does not follow that there 
must be an intersection or connection between law and morality on every occasion.
20
 
 The logic underlying the Incorporation Thesis may be seen as derived from the work of 
David Hume and, more specifically, an argument he made that I will refer to as ‘Hume’s Law’.21  
Hume stated his law in this way:  
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have 
always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the 
ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or 
makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a 
sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations 
of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not 
connected with an ought, or an ought not.  This change is 
imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence.  For as this 
ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 
‘tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the 
same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether 
inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from 
others, which are entirely different from it.
22
 
 
                                                 
19
 Ibid 136-41. 
20
 It might be argued that if a legal system adheres to the Necessity Component (see note 18 above), the Separation 
Thesis in this system must fail; however, I do not think this is a necessary consequence.  Simply because a legal 
norm must be based on some moral norm does not mean that the legal norm will be moral.  Take, for example, the 
situation where a legal system requires legal norms respecting abortion to be based on moral principles 
encompassing the right to life.  In such a system, the legislature could pass a legal norm requiring the banning of all 
abortions.  Such a legal norm, at least arguably, could be considered immoral in some respects because it violates 
moral principles of liberty.  The converse case would also be true of a legal system that requires its legal norms to 
comply with moral principles of liberty.  If a legal norm is thus passed allowing for abortions, thereby satisfying the 
liberty principles, it is at least arguable that aspects of this law would be immoral for it would violate the separate 
moral principles relating to the sanctity of life.  Either way, the thought experiment demonstrates that even in a 
system adopting the Necessity Component, the Inclusive Positivist (and in fact all Positivists) could argue that the 
Separation Thesis remains unadulterated. 
21
 Indeed Richard Hare has characterized it as such: Richard Hare, The Language of Morals (New York, NY: 
Clarendon Press, 1952) at 29, 44.  
22
 A Treatise of Human Nature, Selby-Bigge, ed, Book III (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2006) at 469 [Hume] 
[emphasis original]. 
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Boiled down, Hume is (correctly) asserting that a logical fallacy exists when one attempts to 
derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.  It follows from this notion that simply because it is the case that a 
law does or laws do intersect with morality, it does not follow that a law or laws ought to always 
intersect with morality, or indeed that laws do always intersect with morality.
23
  It is this last line 
of reasoning that began to inform the beginnings of Inclusive Positivism, including the views of 
its founder, H.L.A. Hart, and his arguments pertaining to the Separation Thesis. 
 
1.1.1.1 Hart and Inclusive Positivism 
Hart established some of the foundations of Inclusive Positivism at the 1958 Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Lecture when he presented his now renowned paper “Positivism and the 
Separation of Law and Morals”.24  Through the paper, Hart strongly and influentially argued that 
there is a necessary distinction between what law is and what law ought to be (a point that 
follows Hume-type logic) and, of specific importance to Inclusive Positivism, he cautioned that 
this distinction cannot be applied formalistically and/or uniformly to all aspects of the law.
25
  
Hart supported this argument by introducing, what I will refer to throughout this project as, the 
‘Core/Penumbra’ Thesis.26  In somewhat crude terms, the thesis holds that although it must be 
accepted that words, and therefore laws, are open textured
27
 in nature and therefore potentially 
indeterminate, words and laws will nevertheless contain both a core of settled meaning as well as 
a penumbra of alternative meanings.
28
  In identifying and understanding the nature of language 
                                                 
23
 See e.g. Hart-Positivism supra note 3 at 606-15. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Neil MacCormick has argued that Hart gleaned the notion of law being open textured in nature from the work of 
Friedrich Waissman: see Friedrich Waissman, “Verifiability” (1945-1946) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Supplementary Volumes 119 [Waissman]. 
28
 Hart-Positivism supra note 3 at 607. 
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and thus the nature of laws in this way, Hart was able to further assert that judges apply what the 
law actually is in the vast majority of cases based on an applicable law’s core of settled meaning, 
but that judges will also, when necessary, resort to a rational consideration of what the law ought 
to be when that judge is forced into a law’s penumbra of alternative meanings.29  For Hart, when 
a judge is so forced, s/he is considering and engaging with “problems of the penumbra”.30 
The above, however, begs the following question: when one is amongst the penumbra of 
a legal norm, what ought to be?  Hart answered this question by arguing that issues as to what the 
law ought to be are the subject of many different points of view,
31
 and of these points of view, 
only one will be moral in nature.  It follows from this that a judge will consider many different 
points of view when operating within the penumbra, with only one of those views being moral.
32
  
So in essence, for Hart, when a judge considers what the law ought to be, that judge will need to 
consider a variety of different ‘standards of criticism’ that reflect the notion of ‘ought’.33  While 
one of the standards that a judge may consider is a moral standard, there will be other standards 
of what the law ought to be that a judge may consider which will not be moral in character.
34
  
This reasoning not only suggests that the Separation Thesis holds true, but it also provides a way 
by which a legal norm may be based on moral criteria.  This, as I have already outlined, is at the 
root of the Incorporation Thesis and thus demonstrates why Hart’s legal philosophy helped found 
Inclusive Positivism.  
                                                 
29
 Ibid at 608. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid at 612-13. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Ibid at 613 (In discussing the distinction between what law is and what law ought to be, Hart states that “We must, 
I think, beware of thinking in a too simple-minded fashion about the word ‘ought.’  This is not because there is no 
distinction to be made between law as it is and ought to be.  Far from it.  It is because the distinction should be 
between what is and what from many different points of view ought to be.  The word ‘ought’ merely reflects the 
presence of some standard of criticism; one of these standards is a moral standard but not all standards are moral.” 
[emphasis added]). 
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What I have been attempting to demonstrate up to this point is that Inclusive Positivism is 
accommodating in nature and, of special importance, that it is accommodating to notions and 
principles of morality, for it recognizes that morality can at times be a valid source of law.  
Indeed, this sub-paradigm of Positivism does not draw any unyielding lines between law and 
morality when it comes to validity, though it may still insist upon a separation between, or at 
least some necessary distinction between, law and morality.  Another form of Positivism, 
however, rests upon such a staunch line being drawn between law and morality with respect to 
validity.  It is that form, Exclusive Positivism, which I now turn to discuss. 
 
1.1.2 Exclusive Positivism 
Exclusive Positivism
35
 departs from Inclusive Positivism in a significant way with 
respect to both the Sources Thesis and the Separation Thesis.  While Inclusive Positivists are 
willing to accommodate morality and moral principles within a conception of legal validity and a 
conception of Legal Positivism, Exclusive Positivists are not, and they further believe that it 
would be logically inconsistent to do so.
36
  As Joseph Raz, a key proponent of Exclusive 
Positivism,
37
 notes in discussing the ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ forms of the Sources Thesis (the strong 
conforming to Exclusive Positivism with weak conforming to Inclusive Positivism): 
The difference between the weak and the strong social theses is 
that the strong one insists, whereas the weak one does not, that the 
existence and content of every law is fully determined by social 
                                                 
35
 See generally Marmor supra note 7 at 104-24 (Marmor does a terrific job of outlining and defending the sub-
paradigm of Exclusive Positivism at a general level.  As a matter of methodology, he usefully compares and 
contrasts his own views and arguments with those of Inclusive Positivism). 
36
 See e.g. Raz-Authority supra note 7 at 46-47 and Marmor supra at 104-16. 
37
 I should note that labeling Raz an Exclusive Positivist is a generalization that Raz himself does not share, nor does 
he find useful.  Raz’s theories are complex, detailed, and nuanced, and as such any generalization (like all 
generalizations) carries with it a certain amount of risk.  That said, for conceptual purposes with respect to this 
project, the label is fitting and, in my view, quite useful when taken in context.  Therefore, the label will be 
maintained, though the reader would be wise to note this comment. 
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sources.  On the other hand, the weak thesis, but not the strong 
one, builds into the law conditions of efficacy and institutionality.  
The two theses are logically independent.
38
 
 
From this, Raz goes on to defend the strong form of the Sources Thesis and in doing so defends a 
key component and distinguishing feature of Exclusive Positivism.
39
  To make the point more 
plain, Exclusive Positivism does not allow for the incorporation of morality as a basis for legal 
validity in a legal system because morality is not a conventional or social source.  Indeed, it is a 
moral source, and Exclusive Positivism holds that law may only flow from social sources.  As 
Andrei Marmor states, for Exclusive Positivism,  
[l]egal validity is exhausted by reference to the conventional 
sources of law: all law is source based, and anything which is not 
source based is not law.  …the main controversies about legal 
validity, … are basically about the relations between law and 
morality.  Exclusive positivism denies, whereas inclusive 
positivism accepts, that there can be instances where determining 
what the law is, follow from moral considerations about that which 
it is there to settle.
40
 
 
In other words, for Exclusive Positivists, law is law and morality is morality, and the two cannot 
and thus do not cross each other’s delimitated boundaries when considering the question ‘what is 
law’. 
 As one may come to notice, the above agrument requires a different interpretation of the 
Separation Thesis as compared to the interpretation endorsed by Inclusive Positivists.  Again, for 
Inclusive Positivists, the Separation Thesis holds that there is no necessary connection between 
law and morality as far as validity is concerned, though there may be some intersections between 
the two.  That said, while Exclusive Positivists do subscribe to this belief, they do so in a 
stronger form.  As such, the Separation Thesis as it pertains to Exclusive Positivism is 
                                                 
38
 Raz-Authority supra note 7 at 46-47 [emphasis added]. 
39
 Ibid at 47-52. 
40
 Marmor supra note 7 at 104. 
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interpreted as implying that there is no connection between law and morality, full stop, with 
regards to requirements of legal validity.
41
   It may be generally stated then that for Exclusive 
Positivism, law and morality are distinct and separate concepts. 
 
1.1.2.1 Raz, Authority, and Exclusionary/Pre-emptive Reasons 
Joseph Raz is one of the most insightful and important legal and political philosophers of 
modern times.  He has written many books that have profound implications for one’s 
understanding of the nature of law, politics, and political institutions.
42
  To help fulfill the 
purposes of this project, and to help elucidate Exclusive Positivism, it will prove helpful to 
briefly discuss Raz’s conception of authority, including his notion of exclusionary/pre-emptive 
reasons.
43
  His ideas in this regard will also, somewhat indirectly, support the theory of judicial 
adjudication expounded in Chapter 4. 
Authority for Exclusive Positivists is an important concept, for it helps explain how 
morality is to be removed from consideration with respect to legal validity.  For Raz, law claims 
legitimate authority over its subjects and in doing so pre-empts and aims to exclude any non-
legally recognized reasons that may bear on one’s considerations of whether or not to conform to 
a legal directive.
44
  When a legal norm exists, it acts as a reason for individuals to conform to it, 
and also excludes other non-legal reasons, including moral reasons, to not conform to that 
                                                 
41
 See generally ibid. 
42
 Raz-Authority supra note 7; Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics, revised ed 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1994) [Raz-Ethics]; The Morality of Freedom, (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1986) [Raz-Morality]; Between Authority and Interpretation, (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) [Raz-Interpretation]; Practical Reason and Norms, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999) 
[Raz-Practical]. 
43
 For discussions pertaining to authority: see Raz-Authority supra at 3-28 and Raz-Ethics supra at 210-37.  For 
discussions pertaining to exclusionary/pre-emptive reasons: see Raz-Authority supra at 17, 22-23, 26-27, 32-33, 
Raz-Practical supra at 35-48, and Raz-Morality supra at 57-62. Hereinafter I will refer to exclusionary/pre-emptive 
reasons mostly as pre-emptive as this is what Raz calls them in his most recent works.  
44
 Raz-Authority supra at 28-31; Raz-Ethics supra at 211-14. 
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norm.
45
  It follows that the very nature of legitimate authority, and more specifically law’s claim 
to it, provides a basis for exclusion of moral criteria with respect to legal validity.  It may be said 
to follow from this then that the concept of authority reinforces the Sources Thesis. 
Raz notes that when institutions, such as a legislature, give an authoritative directive, 
such as that one shall not murder another person, the distinguishing feature of such a directive 
compared to others is that it has a special pre-emptory status.
46
  The directive will do two things: 
firstly, it will reflect (if it is to be legitimate) the dependent reasons of the individual(s) to which 
it applies; and, secondly, it will act to replace (some of) the reasons of the individual(s) to act.
47
  
So, for example, if one believes s/he has a reason to murder another, such as because the other 
severely abused one’s daughter, the directive of the legislature precluding the individual from 
murdering is to replace (i.e. pre-empt) that individual’s own reasons to murder.  The directive 
will also reflect some of the individual’s dependent reasons, such as, perhaps, that society cannot 
be orderly unless murder is prohibited.  But while Raz argues that one may at times be (morally) 
justified in not obeying an authoritative directive (if that authority is found to be illegitimate by 
running afoul of one’s dependent reasons), this does not change the fact that from the point of 
view of the law, its authoritative directive excludes those reasons when considering liability 
under and pursuant to the law. 
Raz argues that the concept of law claiming authority supports the Sources Thesis and 
results in a rejection of the Incorporation Thesis.
48
  He argues that the nature of authority 
conferred upon an institution is such that it “[l]ends [a] directive its binding force… . [And the 
same authority] does not extend to what it would have directed, given a chance to do so, nor to 
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 See ibid. 
46
 Raz-Ethics supra note 42 at 212. 
47
 See ibid at 214. 
48
 Ibid at 229-31. 
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all that is entailed by what it has directed.”49  The idea we can extrapolate from this is that a legal 
directive is strictly legal because the nature of authority in the legal sense is such that it only 
confers authority for this type of directive.  It is not open to moral directives, or pragmatic 
directives, although these too may be conferred from authority, just not legal authority.  As Raz 
goes on to state, an implication of the Sources Thesis is that “Moral argument can establish what 
legal institutions should have said or should have held but not what they did say or hold.”50  In 
other words, evaluative arguments about the law do not assist in the identification of what law 
actually is.  This is because it must be remembered that for Raz, a law is a social fact attributable 
to the workings of the Sources Thesis.
51
  In any event, what one may pull from Raz’s arguments 
as a whole is that it is the limiting nature of authority, limiting in the sense that authority limits 
the sources of law to that of social sources, that buttresses the Sources Thesis, resulting in an 
exclusion of morality from considerations of legal validity; and what results from all of this is a 
sub-paradigm of Positivism known as Exclusive Positivism, whose name resembles the fact that 
the sub-paradigm operates exclusive of morality with respect to its underlying theses.
52
 
 
1.1.2.2 Shapiro and Law as Plans 
Scott Shapiro has recently developed a theory, rooted in Exclusive Positivism, which 
holds that legal norms are plans and that, consequently, a system of laws is actually an intricate 
system of plans.
53
  The theory is an account of the nature of law and is developed in his book, 
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 Ibid at 231. 
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 Ibid [emphasis added]. 
52
 I note for cautionary purposes that this statement might be viewed as somewhat misleading.  My argument is not 
meant to stand for the proposition that moral/evaluative arguments and analysis cannot be undertaken by Positivists; 
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Legality.
54
  The Planning Theory of Law, as he calls it, essentially holds that legal activity (i.e. 
the exercise of legal authority) “[i]s an activity of social planning.”55  The end result is the 
‘Planning Thesis’, a thesis which holds that legal activity is social planning.  Shapiro takes great 
pains, however, to emphasize and demonstrate that the Planning Thesis is more than a simple 
notion that legal activity is an activity “[i]n formulating, adopting, repudiating, affecting, and 
applying norms for members of [a] community.”56  For him, legal activity is the very activity of 
planning.
57
 
Shapiro’s conception of law as plans is grounded in the idea that law is social in nature, 
and that because human beings are both social and ‘planning creatures’ in nature, human beings 
create law with the purpose of planning.
58
  Planning is required whenever the ‘circumstances of 
legality’ arise, and such arises whenever a society faces serious moral issues “[w]hose solutions 
are complex, contentious, or arbitrary.”59 In the end, a system of (complex) plans that may be 
called a legal system is created, with the aim of the system being to guide, organize, and monitor 
behaviour.
60
  The fundamental goal of legal planning, according to Shapiro, is to remedy 
deficiencies inherent to other forms of planning.
61
   
Some general examples will help illustrate the point of what is meant by a plan.  The first 
example is what Shapiro calls ‘top-down planning’, which can be the result of legal norms such 
as legislation. Take for example regulatory schemes, which are usually broad in nature.  Such 
schemes begin with general rules conferred by statute that have their details filled in over time, 
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whether by officials within the scheme or judges in cases.
62
  These schemes go from broad rules 
to more narrow and specific rules, thus rendering them ‘top down’ in their planning nature.  Take 
for example the regulation of food and drugs in the United States.  The regulatory scheme 
consists of the Food and Drug Administration, a government organization given broad powers 
conferred by statute to both regulate and make regulations that guide individual behaviour with 
respect to certain foods, drugs, medical devices, etc.  The organization and officials are tasked 
with regulating and thus engage in top down planning with respect to that which they regulate.   
The second example is that of what Shapiro identifies as ‘bottom-up planning’, which 
occurs for example in common law systems through the decisions of judges.
63
  Because of the 
‘political conviction’ that courts are not to engage in broad reaching social planning and are to 
stick to the more narrow issues that come before them, bottom-up planning is what results.  
Shapiro uses the example of tort law, whereby in its beginnings there were specific duties 
imposed on individuals depending on their capacities, relationship to others, etc.
64
  Over time, 
courts broadened the rules of tort liability, eventually settling on the modern rule known as the 
neighbor principle: that everyone owes a duty of care to their neighbours.
65
  Shapiro argues that 
this consolidation of the various tort rules demonstrates bottom-up planning because, in so 
consolidating, the court advanced the common law one level up the ‘legal planning tree’.66 
It is prudent to note that even though Shapiro provides a conceptualization of law as 
plans, he makes clear that it is not his goal to draw any sort of analogy between the concept of 
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law on the one hand and the concept of plans on the other, but to instead unravel the inherent 
implication that laws are plans, and that the nature of law is planning.
67
  In his own words, “The 
existence conditions for law are the same as those for plans because the fundamental rules of 
legal systems are plans.  Their function is to structure legal activity so that participants can work 
together and thereby achieve goods and realize values that would otherwise be unattainable.”68  
It can be gleaned from this that Shapiro’s theory of law, while certainly unique in many ways, 
ultimately adheres to a methodology familiar to Positivism of being descriptive as opposed to 
evaluative in nature. 
One additional and important highlight should be made with respect to Shapiro’s theory 
of law as plans.  Shapiro’s theory, as he positions it, is inextricably linked to Legal Positivism, 
and as such maintains that each of the Social Fact Thesis, the Sources Thesis, and the Separation 
Thesis hold true within the theory.  In fact, Shapiro asserts that “[t]he existence of legal authority 
can only be determined sociologically: the question of whether a body has legal power is never 
one of moral legitimacy; it is a question of whether the relevant officials of that system accept a 
plan that authorizes and requires deference to that body.”69  And then, in drawing inspiration 
from one of the founders of Positivism in general, John Austin, Shapiro asserts that, 
“[P]ositivism is trivially and uncontroversially true in the case of plans: the existence of a plan is 
one thing, its merits or demerits quite another.”70  These two quotes together are sufficient to 
demonstrate that in Shapiro’s view, a conception of law as plans conforms with the three main 
                                                 
67
 Ibid at 119. 
68
 Ibid [emphasis added]  
69
 Ibid. 
70
 Ibid [emphasis added] (It is readily apparent that Shapiro here is playing off of Austin’s now somewhat iconic 
assertion that “The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another.”  The statement is considered by 
some to be a defining one for Legal Positivism and especially the Separation Thesis found within Legal Positivism.  
In Chapter 3 of Legality, Shapiro usefully provides an analysis of Austinian theory, which is also known as the 
Sanction Theory of Law). 
26 
 
Positivistic theses because the adoption and acceptance of plans are done so by social sources 
that have the legal authority to do so (thus a plan, once adopted, exists as social fact), and once a 
legal plan exists, questions as to its moral status are independent of its existence as law.  In other 
words, Shapiro may be seen as endorsing the view that the moral status of a legal plan does not 
and cannot undermine that plan’s legal validity.  Since a conception of plans exists exclusive of 
morality, it follows that Shapiro endorses Exclusive Positivism. 
 
Legal Positivism, as outlined above, commits itself to certain theses and in doing so 
recognizes the same as being foundational to the theoretical paradigm.  Historically, many of 
these theses have come into conflict (somewhat inevitably) with the theses of other theoretical 
paradigms, and most notably those of Natural Law theory.  Because some of the theses native to 
Natural Law theory prove important for broader discussions that take place within this project, 
most particularly in Chapter 5, it will be useful at this point to offer a general description of the 
various theses.  So, with this in mind, I turn now to the paradigm of Natural Law theory. 
 
1.2 Natural Law Theory 
Natural Law theory,
71
 which for convenience I will refer to from now on as Naturalism, 
has deep historical roots, the beginnings of which can be traced as far back as ancient Greece, to 
the written works of both Plato and Aristotle.
72
  Since this time, the Naturalistic tradition has 
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been built upon and modified through the works of numerous other theorists.  These works, in 
turn, helped shape the overall evolution of the paradigm.  Included amongst Naturalism’s 
theorists are the likes of Thomas Aquinas, William Blackstone, Lon Fuller, John Finnis, Ronald  
Dworkin, and more recently, Mark Murphy.
73
  Now, while it could hardly be disputed that 
Naturalism has undergone change and evolution over time, it remains true that some fundamental 
tenets of Naturalism, in a general sense, have remained the same.  It will be my goal in this 
section to give a general description of these tenets by referring to certain broad theses of 
Naturalism, and in doing so will contrast these theses with the most pertinent theses of Legal 
Positivism.  To aid one lexicographically, I shall label the theses of Naturalism to be discussed as 
the ‘Necessary (Moral) Connection’ Thesis or NCT, the ‘Validity Thesis’, and the ‘Right 
Answer Thesis’.  Included within this discussion will be brief highlights of an important concept 
to legal theory in general, the concept of the ‘focal meaning’ and ‘central case’ as advanced by 
Finnis. 
 
1.2.1 The Necessary Connection Thesis versus the Separation Thesis 
The first, and somewhat overarching, Naturalist thesis is the NCT.  As a preliminary, 
much like the way by which the Social Fact Thesis is interrelated and dependent upon the 
Sources Thesis, the NCT is interrelated with the Validity Thesis.  In rudimentary terms, NCT 
may be stated as follows: there is a necessary connection between law and morality (however 
                                                 
73
 Select and important readings from these theorists include: Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Parts I-III 
(Notre Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1981); Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010); Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised ed, (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1964) [Fuller-Morality] and Lon L Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself, (Boston, MA: Beacon 
Press, 1966) [Fuller-Quest]; John Finnis, Natural Law & Natural Rights, 2nd ed, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2011) [Finnis-Natural]; Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 1986) [Dworkin-
Empire] and Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977, 1978); 
Mark C Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
[Murphy-Rationality]. 
28 
 
that connection is to be understood), and the necessity of this connection bears on the validity of 
legal norms.
74
  The latter encapsulates the Validity Thesis to be discussed below.  What is 
important at this point, however, is that because of the NCT, the Validity Thesis seems to 
directly conflict with Positivism’s Separation Thesis. 
Regardless of the era, the NCT remained central to Naturalism in some sense.  That said, 
conceptions of morality, and as is perhaps more readily apparent, the language by which notions 
of morality have been presented, has changed over time.  Some of the more classical theorists, 
such as Aquinas, make reference to concepts of ‘Divinity’ and ‘Eternal Law’ or ‘Divine Law’, 
with such concepts acting as reference points for that which is ‘right’ or ‘good’.75  These 
reference points are a sort of gauge by which individuals are supposed to let guide their actions.
76
  
Other, more contemporary, Naturalists have preferred to adopt language that is more secular in 
nature, for instance by referring to notions of ‘practical reasonableness’77 or ‘practical 
rationality’78 when discussing conceptions of morality and the law.79  But despite any changes in 
language, each of these Naturalists may still be seen as building upon the basic Thomistic 
tradition of gleaning a true secular meaning and/or argument that is grounded in more secular 
philosophy as opposed to pure theological argument.  In other words, these theorists, in the spirit 
of Aquinas, aim to expound secular philosophical argument on topics that had been almost 
exclusively canvassed through theological argument.  In any event, the main point is that 
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regardless of the language used and the period of time in which an argument falling within the 
purview of Naturalism is made, it is a fundamental requirement of Naturalism that there be a 
necessary connection between law and morality, and this fundamental requirement may be called 
the NCT. 
 
1.2.2 Fuller, Morality, and Validity – Procedural Natural Law Theory 
As previously mentioned, a second fundamental thesis of Naturalism that is interrelated 
with the NCT is the Validity Thesis.  The Validity Thesis states that when a law is immoral in 
content, or violates fundamental notions of morality, then that law is not a valid law at all and, 
consequently, one would not be obligated to follow it.
80
  The thrust of the thesis is that the 
validity of a law is based on its content, and when its content is immoral or runs afoul of 
fundamental principles of morality, that law will be void of legal validity.
81
 
A thought experiment by Lon Fuller will help illustrate the point.  In The Morality of 
Law, through an entertaining allegory, Fuller proffered eight ways by which one could make law 
fail.
82
  Fuller’s eight ways are: 1) fail to make rules such that any institutional decision is ad hoc; 
2) fail to make rules known, or to provide a way by which the rules could be made known, to 
those individuals that the rules so apply; 3) implement retroactive laws to such an extent that the 
legal system’s integrity is undermined; 4) make rules that are so confusing that members of 
society cannot understand them; 5) enact rules that contradict one another; 6) make rules such 
that conformity to them is impossible; 7) change rules so frequently that members of a society 
will be unable to orient themselves to those rules; and 8) fail to communicate the rules properly 
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so that the actual rules and the communicated rules differ substantively.
83
  A failure to make law 
in each of these eight ways essentially boils down to a failure to comply with procedural 
morality, which Fuller argues will destroy any notion of a legal system and thus any notion of 
law.
84
  In a real sense then, Fuller offers a procedural way by which the content of a law, void of 
morality, will affect that law’s validity.  This thought experiment brings to focus the merits of the 
Validity Thesis. 
I will make one final introductory point with respect to the Validity Thesis.  The thesis is 
one of degree, and includes a strong version and a weak version.  The strong version, namely that 
a law is not a law if it is immoral in character, was mainly advanced by some of the classical 
Naturalists such as Plato and St. Augustine.  It, just like the procedural view above (a weaker 
version), runs contrary to the Sources Thesis, with this thesis, it will be remembered, being 
unconcerned with any moral evaluation of a law or set of laws.  To be fair, some of the 
contemporary Naturalists do not necessarily subscribe to the strong version of the Validity 
Thesis, as they would be content to rest upon a weaker version of it.
85
  But what is important is 
that no matter the form, whether strong or weak, the Validity Thesis overall recognizes that the 
validity criteria of law is in one way or another constrained by morality, and it is this point that 
shall prove important for this project.  It is, what Finnis would call, a ‘central case’ for 
Naturalism, i.e. a state of affairs that goes to the theory’s focal meaning.86  In the words of 
Finnis, identifying the central cases and focal meaning will allow one to exploit “[t]he systematic 
multi-significance of one’s theoretical terms (without losing sight of the ‘principle or rationale’ 
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of this multi-significance)…”.87  In other words, while the nuances and the inferred implications 
of a thesis within a theory have their own significance, one should be careful not use these to 
obscure the principle or rationale underlying it all. 
 
1.2.3 Dworkin’s Theory of Interpretation 
Ronald Dworkin outlined his view of Interpretive Legal Theory, or Interpretivism, in an 
article titled “Law’s Ambition for Itself”,88 and this theory was extensively developed in a 
number of different publications including, most notably, his seminal book on the nature of 
judicial adjudication, Law’s Empire.89  The former is helpful because of the way in which it 
outlines the basics of Interpretivism, and the latter is useful as it significantly builds upon those 
basics and applies them in a variety of ways.  In what follows I will refer to both his article when 
instructive and also Law’s Empire when further detail is required. 
There are three stages to Interpretivism in general.  Firstly, at the preinterpretive stage, 
one goes about identifying the applicable rules and standards that may govern a problem.
90
  
Then, at the second or interpretive stage, the individual comes to settle on a ‘general 
justification’ of the rules and standards identified at the preinterpretive stage.91  And, finally, at 
the postinterpretive stage, the individual refines the justification as needed in the context of the 
problem at hand.
92
   Therefore, for Dworkin, the proper model of judicial adjudication (i.e. 
Interpretivism) “[d]istinguishes between the positive law – the law in the books, the law declared 
in the clear statements of statutes and past court decisions – and the full law, which [the model] 
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takes to be the set of principles of political morality that taken together provide the best 
interpretation of the positive law.”93  In essence, Dworkin’s interpretive model requires the 
consideration and application of moral principles in every instance of adjudication so that the 
positive law is shown “[i]n the best possible light”.94  Dworkin’s Interpretivism flows from his 
concept of law as integrity, a theory that rejects both Positivism (for being overly concerned with 
past rules and standards) and Pragmatism (for being overly concerned with future 
consequences).
95
  Instead, and in order for law to have integrity, law must be seen as being a 
balance of these extremes.  Dworkin argues that this is possible through Interpretivism.   
An interesting, though controversial, thesis that flowed from Interpretivism was the Right 
Answer Thesis.  For Dworkin, when law and adjudication are understood in the proper 
interpretive sense, it is revealed that every legal issue has a ‘right answer’.96  A right answer can 
be reached in any one case because two factors are taken into consideration pursuant to the 
interpretive process.  Firstly, a judge considers which moral principles from a set of moral 
principles best fit the positive law in question.  Secondly (and subsequently), the judge chooses 
the one moral principle out of the fitting principles that best justifies the law in the context of the 
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case.
97
  Dworkin notes that judges may at times disagree about the outcome of a case because 
they may have different justifications, but this does not change the fact that, for Dworkin, one of 
the justifications is always better (i.e. the one principle that best justifies the positive law).
98
  In 
the end then is the best morally justified answer grounded in positive law for each and every 
case.  And for Dworkin, such answers may be labelled ‘right answers’. 
I should pause here to offer a side note.  Dworkin would not have actually referred to 
himself as a Naturalist.  In fact, he did not find such classifications to be helpful for he believed 
they obscured the nature of his work.
99
  That said, and as one may have already noted, Dworkin’s 
Interpretivism is consistent with the Naturalist paradigm because Interpretivism is inextricably 
linked to morality and moral theory, and uses morality to constrain the positive law.  One thus 
could argue that Interpretivism is consistent with Naturalism, including the NCT, because it 
incorporates moral principles, and consequently morality, into every instance of adjudication.  It 
fuses the positive law with morality, thus creating a necessary link between the two.  Ultimately 
then, for this project’s purposes, it is both sufficient and proper to include Dworkin’s theories 
amongst the paradigm of Naturalism. 
 
1.3 Pragmatic Legal Theory 
Having now outlined the foundations of both Positivism and Naturalism, the remaining 
theoretical paradigm to be discussed is Pragmatism.  The workings of this paradigm are a bit 
more difficult to resolve, however, for the concept of Pragmatism may take on a variety of 
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different meanings.  In a sense, it is somewhat malleable.  For example, some proponents of the 
paradigm focus on efficiency when discussing Pragmatism, while others focus on consequences 
with a viewpoint as to what would be practical for the future.  Others still may combine these 
ideas (or others) and attribute them to the paradigm of Pragmatism.  Likewise, my view of 
Pragmatism, revealed in Chapter 4, will combine certain aspects of these things, while also 
introducing other considerations.  Nevertheless, it will be useful to highlight some theses of 
Pragmatism that will bear some significance for this project, such as, what I label, the ‘Multiple 
Right Answers Thesis’ or MRAT and the ‘Best Choice Thesis’.  In the end, while my view of 
Pragmatism may diverge from others, these two theses will be built upon to provide a more 
complete explanation of the nature of judicial adjudication as compared to, in my view, those 
that have come before. 
 
1.3.1 Pragmatism and Theory 
Before a discussion of the applicable theses takes place, a brief note by way of digression 
is in order.  At a philosophical level, the term and beginnings of Pragmatism, separate from legal 
Pragmatism, can be attributed to Charles Sanders Pierce, William James, and John Dewey.
100
  
The collective works of these individuals brought to bear the importance of practical 
considerations with respect to action and truth, amongst other things.
101
  These three individuals 
gave in-depth accounts of the relationship between Pragmatism and topics such as psychology, 
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education, democracy, and ethics.
102
  These accounts, and the various arguments found within, 
are outside the scope of this project, and therefore I will not spend much time specifically 
dwelling on these authors’ works.  Instead, I will look to more recent theorists that have applied 
the concept of Pragmatism to law.  In particular, I will draw on the work of Richard Posner (a 
more law and economics based Pragmatist) and Margaret Radin (a more practical and pluralistic 
based Pragmatist).
103
  Together, these theorists will aid in establishing a workable foundation to 
be returned to later. 
It is interesting to note that some may be of the view that the terms Pragmatism and 
theory are actually antithetical to one another because the latter deals with abstract thought and 
general thinking while the former is more concerned with specific practical considerations.
104
  
Philosophy and practicality are sometimes considered analogous to oil and water.  Indeed, some 
proponents of Pragmatism might suggest that the paradigm is simply a useful explanation of 
necessary practicalities as opposed to any general theory.  That said, while the merits of such a 
claim are debatable,
105
 implications from this debate have no bearing upon this project, and I will 
not undertake to engage the puzzle here.  It will be enough to generally hold that Pragmatism is 
able to inform and clarify aspects of a general theory of law, such as the aspect of judicial 
adjudication in a theory of law as dimensions. 
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1.3.2 The Multiple Right Answer Thesis and the Best Choice Thesis 
The discussion under this heading is much expanded upon in Chapter 4, but for now, it 
will serve a useful introductory function to outline in basic terms the two theses of Pragmatism 
that are most pertinent to this project.  The theses, again, are the MRAT and the Best Choice 
Thesis.  The former, basically, holds that in any one legal dispute, there exist multiple answers 
that may solve the dispute in question, and that each of the answers would be correct in law if so 
chosen as a solution.  The latter is a natural result and necessary corollary of the former, and 
holds that in considering that in any one legal dispute there will be multiple right answers, the 
function of the judge is to choose which of the answers is ‘best’ in the circumstances.  This is a 
minimalist version of the thesis, and the necessary detail will be added in due time.  But before 
doing so, it will be helpful to consider the fundamentals of both theses in more detail. 
 
1.3.3 Posner’s Pragmatism and Judicial Adjudication 
Posner is both a United States appellate level judge and law professor at the University of 
Chicago.  His dual positions give him an interesting background by which to engage in legal 
theory, especially with respect to judicial adjudication.  In his book How Judges Think,
106
 Posner 
recognizes the importance of consequences and practicalities, and lucidly illustrates their 
importance to judicial adjudication.
107
  As an introduction to the paradigm, Posner states that: 
‘Pragmatism,’ in the sense in which the word is used in the 
pragmatic theory of judicial behavior, [requires] careful definition.  
But for now it is enough to note that the word refers to basing 
judgments (legal or otherwise) on consequences, rather than on 
deduction from premises in the manner of a syllogism.  
Pragmatism bears a family resemblance to utilitarianism and, in a 
commercial society like ours, to welfare economics, but without a 
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commitment to the specific ways in which those philosophies 
evaluate consequences.  In law, pragmatism refers to basing a 
judicial decision on the effects the decision is likely to have, rather 
than on language of a state or of a case, or more generally on a pre-
existing rule.
108
 
 
The main point is that judges, as Pragmatists, are mainly concerned with the potential 
implications of any decision that they may make, and thus find foundational guidance in those 
implications when deciding any one case.  A second point of importance derivable from this 
quote is that the decision is not based on deduction or reasoning by syllogism, and because it is 
not so based, a different type of decision making mechanism is to be engaged.  
Posner’s Pragmatism has an additional characteristic to it, that being one of cautionary 
realism,
109
 and this characteristic, in a sense, underlies the Best Choice Thesis.  As Posner notes: 
Pragmatism provides local rather than universal guidance to 
judicial action.  And its local utility depends on the degree to 
which the society is normatively homogenous.  The more 
homogenous, and therefore the wider the agreement on what kind 
of consequences are good and what kind are bad (and how good 
and how bad), the greater the guidance that pragmatism will 
provide. 
 
… 
 
Although pragmatic adjudication rarely generates enough 
information to enable a decision that produces a social optimum, 
often it produces an approximation that is good enough for the 
law’s purposes.110 
 
Embedded in this reasoning is the notion that although Pragmatism has inherent limits, it will on 
most occasions be apt to produce a decision that is sufficient for the time and for the law’s 
purposes.   
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The above two passages touch upon two key Pragmatist concepts.  Firstly, Posner notes 
that judges must ultimately base their decisions in consequences. This requires forward looking 
methodology and practical considerations.  And, secondly, Posner recognizes that there will 
never be an ideal decision, for any and all decisions have their pros and cons, good consequences 
and bad consequences, and judges therefore can only make the best decision in any one 
circumstance.  Ultimately then, on Posner’s view, Pragmatic judicial adjudication is the result of 
a judge analyzing the consequences that a decision will bear, recognizing the utility of the 
different kinds of consequences (thus rendering one able to find some decisions more desirable 
as compared to others), and then selecting the best decision possible.   
As may already be apparent, the two concepts flowing from Posner’s Pragmatism are 
inextricably linked to both the MRAT and the Best Choice Thesis.  Because judges are duty 
bound to make a decision in any one case no matter the difficulty in so doing, a consideration of 
consequences implies that there is more than one potential option.  If there was only one option 
that could be so chosen, a consideration of consequences would be fruitless, for the 
consequences would be automatic and necessary.  It only makes sense then that there would be 
multiple answers in legal disputes, any one of which would be correct in law and thus ‘right’.  
This accords with the MRAT.  In addition, Posner’s recognition that non-ideal circumstances 
will underpin all legal disputes suggests that the best judges can do in adjudicating these disputes 
is select options that result in the best consequences, and this accords with the Best Choice 
Thesis. 
 
39 
 
1.3.4 Radin and Pragmatism 
While not necessarily a general legal theorist, in my view Radin has written a number of 
important articles with respect to Pragmatism, including one that will prove especially instructive 
for this project titled “The Pragmatist and the Feminist”.111  In her article, Radin argues, in the 
context of women’s issues, that the consequences flowing from choices relating to such issues 
are non-ideal in nature, and that no matter the situation that may arise whereby choice is needed, 
harm will manifest itself regardless of the ultimate choice.
112
  Radin’s argument, however, need 
not be restricted to women’s issues, as it may be generalized in the following way.  Whenever 
one must make a decision, one will necessarily be confronted with harmful consequences and 
beneficial consequences that flow from that decision.  The question then is what one is to do with 
these consequences.  For Radin, the decision will be one of choice, with the ultimate choice 
involving considerations of which decision (and the consequences flowing therefrom) will do the 
least amount of harm and/or conversely the most amount of good.
113
  
 
1.4 Conclusion 
At the beginning of this Chapter, I set out to describe the fundamentals of Positivism, 
Naturalism, and Pragmatism.  These fundamentals present themselves through a series of theses, 
some of which fundamentally conflict with others.  For example, Positivism’s Sources Thesis 
and Social Fact Thesis, in conjunction with the Separability Thesis, fundamentally conflict with 
Naturalism’s NCT and Validity Thesis.  This is largely due to the fact that, on the one hand, 
                                                 
111
 Radin supra note 103; see also Margaret Radin, “Market-Inalienability” (1987) 100 Harv L Rev 1849 and 
Margaret Radin, “Justice in the Market Domain” in John W Chapman & J Roland Pennock, eds, Markets and 
Justice (New York, NY: NYU Press, 1989). 
112
 Radin supra note 103 at 1700. 
113
 Ibid at1701. 
40 
 
Positivism insists on a distinction between law and morality, whereas Naturalism, on the other 
hand, does not and in fact insists the opposite.  In addition, two different theories of judicial 
adjudication were described.  The first, Interpretivism, insists that judges apply moral principles 
in order to come to the right decision in each and every case.  The second, stemming from 
Pragmatism, insists that judges recognize that in any one legal dispute there will be multiple right 
answers, and that they must therefore focus on the consequences of their decisions in order to 
determine which answer is ‘best’ in the circumstances of any one case.  These two theories were 
also fundamentally at odds with one another, for Interpretivism held that in every case there will 
be one right answer, whereas Pragmatism held that in every legal dispute there will be multiple 
right answers.   
All of the theses and their parent theoretical paradigms claim to be correct and 
fundamental to any proper explanation of the nature of law, yet the inescapable truth (or so it 
would seem) is that each finds irreconcilable conflict with one or more of the others.  The result 
is a significant conundrum.  The conundrum is compounded by the fact that each theoretical 
paradigm appears not only plausible, but also logical, persuasive, and filled with substantial 
value.  Therefore, what is one to do?  Should one simply pick sides?  Should one remain 
agnostic, waiting for more convincing arguments to be advanced over time, and then, at that 
time, pick sides?  Or, is there another, perhaps more suitable, option?  I am of the view that there 
is a more suitable option, and it may be called the theory of law as dimensions.  The core of this 
theory is the concept of a dimension, and therefore in order to understand what is meant by the 
concept, I now turn to Chapter 2 to discuss the fundamentals relating thereto. 
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Chapter 2: Fundamentals of Dimensions and the Basic Elements of Time 
 
Having navigated the fundamentals of various theoretical paradigms found within legal 
theory, it will prove useful to now turn attention to the fundamentals of the theory of law as 
dimensions.  The plan for this chapter is to develop a foundation for my theory of law as 
dimensions, one sufficient for a dimensional analysis that is to take place in PART II.  So, before 
discussing any of the substantive content of the dimensions themselves, it will be instructive to 
first consider what the concept of a dimension is.  Armed with this concept, I will be in a better 
position to explain why dimensions are needed to more fully and accurately explain the nature of 
law. 
I begin this chapter by briefly discussing the history of legal theory, how developments 
within that history have led to increasing complexity, and how this complexity eventually leads 
to increased confusion worthy of remedy.  This history lesson, of sorts, will act as a primer for 
further discussions involving the nature of dimensions, including what dimensions are and why 
they are useful to legal theory.  The reasoning here will lead me into a brief analysis of the 
discipline of theoretical physics, with the goal of drawing an analogy between spatial dimensions 
and law’s dimensions.  This will be followed by an analysis of the elements of time, and how 
these elements assist in defining each of law’s dimensions.  I will then consider a methodological 
distinction in a theory of law as dimensions, namely whether it entails conventional theorizing, 
an exercise in ‘meta-theory’, or both.  Finally, I end the chapter by revisiting the three questions 
posited in the introduction to this project.  In this regard, I will begin to suggest that a theory of 
law as dimensions assists in solving the Tertiary Question, namely the delimitation issue between 
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law and morality, or in other words, whether or not law has any necessary connection to 
morality. 
 
2.1 Complexity and Legal Theory 
Legal Theory is somewhat conflicted by a complex history, with this complexity 
compounding over time.  At first blush this point may appear somewhat trivial, and perhaps even 
a bit obvious, because any question about the nature of a field of study within the humanities (or, 
in actuality, most fields of academic study) is bound to be riddled with similar complexity.  For 
academics, this point is straightforward and a simple matter of fact.  It is something that comes 
with the territory so to speak, and normally does not attract much concern.  Questions such as: 
what is sociology? or what is anthropology? philosophy? etc. do not easily lend themselves to 
quick and adequate responses.  Definitions, in this regard, are slippery, elusive, and unforgiving.  
One might answer the question what is law? with the (rather unhelpful) answer, ‘well, law is the 
study of law’, but answers such as these merely beg a whole host of further questions.  For 
example: What is the study of law?  Why does one study law?  Why is there law in any event?  
What is the goal or purpose of law?  Does law have any goals at all?  Is law a matter of 
sociological fact?  Is it even possible to define law at all?
114
 and on and on.  The more one 
questions the more it becomes apparent that a complete and accurate account of the nature of a 
thing – for the purposes of this project, that thing being law – is an account that provides us with 
a complete and accurate account of the true nature of that thing.  It therefore follows that I shall 
be generally occupied throughout this project with seeking an explanation that provides an 
account of the true nature of law.  This is an exercise in truth seeking, and it is this seeking of 
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truth that contributes to the increasing complexity that has compounded legal theory over the 
course of history.  
The search for any one single ‘truth’, a search open to a vast pool of truth seekers limited 
only by an individual’s willingness to actually commit to seeking out the truth and having 
competency in so doing, will naturally produce a wide variety of different perspectives with 
respect to opinions of or about the truth.  These perspectives eventually come to be reinforced by 
the variety of positions consisting of reasons advanced by the proponents of those perspectives 
with the hope that those reasons eventually persuade other truth seekers to adopt a particular 
perspective as the truth, and consequently abandon others.  The proponents may be so successful 
that they persuade other truth seekers to build upon their opinion of the ‘truth’.  Others, we may 
call them opponents of those perspectives, look to advance alternative perspectives supported by 
their own positions and reasons, and in doing so criticize the positions and reasons of the 
currently held perspective with respect to the ‘truth’.  All the while, these individuals have in 
their minds the same overall goal of clarifying the ‘truth’, or (in cases of a paradigm shift) 
finding and then grounding a more accurate ‘truth’.  The process then repeats itself ad infinitum.  
As one may generally notice then, this overall process has significant potential to bring into 
existence a variety of different perspectives with respect to the ‘truth’, with each of these being 
both supported and criticized, in varying degrees from minimal to great, by the proponents and 
opponents of the perspectives (or ‘truths’).115  These ‘truths’ eventually come to be solidified as 
theories of the nature of the thing in question, or in shorter terms, theoretical paradigms. 
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The overall process, however, in a somewhat natural way, results in increasing 
complexity and confusion.  As the complexity grows, it may result in increasingly heightened 
confusion.  If both the complexity and the confusion lead to significant misunderstandings about 
and within the project itself, or if they result in misplaced or misguided paradigms, then those 
paradigms are no longer helpful to the truth seeking goal.  What results is theoretical 
fragmentation, the nature of which has the opposite effect that the goal of seeking out the truth 
aims to achieve.  In other words, theoretical fragmentation obfuscates the truth. 
A true theory of law then, in my view, is one that inches as close to the truth as possible.  
In order for it to do so, it must both provide a true account of the nature of law while also 
remedying any theoretical fragmentation.  The theory of law that I will unravel in this project is 
one that I hope begins to do just this.  It does so by taking some of the leading ‘truths’ with 
respect to the nature of law and then attempting to amalgamate these ‘truths’ in such a way that 
some, though not all, fragmentation may be remedied.  The result is a potentially far reaching 
theory that both unites aspects of the leading theoretical perspectives in legal theory, and at the 
same time filters out some insufficiencies which have come to plague those same perspectives.  
The way by which all of this may be demonstrated is through theoretical ‘dimensions’.  So with 
this in mind, it is time to consider what exactly I mean by the concept of ‘dimensions’. 
 
2.2 What are Dimensions? 
The main thrust and substance of a theory of law as dimensions comes from the idea that 
law exists within a series of separate yet related ‘dimensions’.  Because the concept is 
foundational, it is prudent and useful to take time to dwell upon the question: what is meant by 
dimensions?  In short, dimensions are specific vantage points that have a very important effect 
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on the way by which individuals view and process information.  Once one commits to viewing 
and processing information through any one specific dimension, one will not be able to 
recognize, view, or process information through any other dimension at the same time.  Put 
another way, when one commits to viewing and processing information through a certain 
dimension, one will only be able to view, process, identify, analyze, critique, etc. information 
through the vantage point of that dimension.  The unique vantage point of one dimension, in a 
sense, effectively forbids one from being able to take advantage of the unique powers associated 
with other dimensions.  This fact, however, does not stop one from being able to change the 
vantage point (i.e. dimension) from which one operates within on a different occasion at a 
different point in time.  By analogy, the idea of viewing a concept dimensionally, meaning from 
other vantage points, is akin to having the ability to view objects in a room through night vision 
goggles, versus heat sensor goggles, versus the naked eye.  Within the example, each different 
vantage point (night vision, heat vision, naked eye) gives the observer unique information and, 
ultimately, provides the individual with a different way by which s/he will access and process 
information, with the arguments founded upon that information being unique to the vantage point 
supplying that information, which will be separate from other vantage points. 
The concept of a dimension can be applied to legal theory.  For example, if one is 
operating within one of law’s dimensions, meaning one is viewing and processing law related 
information through a specific vantage point, say the 1
st
-dimension of law, if one is to make 
cogent arguments, one would be required to formulate such arguments with content that is 
consistent with the intrinsic properties and characteristics of that dimension.  The same would 
hold true of the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 dimensions as well.  I recognize, however, that this seems to beg the 
following questions: what are the intrinsic properties of the different dimensions, and how is one 
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to both identify and distinguish those dimensions?  Over the course of this chapter, these 
questions will be answered in full, but for now it is enough to state, as an introduction, that the 
intrinsic properties of each dimension are those general properties that are now considered 
fundamental to Positivism, Naturalism, and Pragmatism.  So, for example, if one seeks to 
advance an argument that is Positivistic in nature, i.e. grounded in fundamental Positive Law 
doctrine, one would be required to operate within the 1
st-
dimension of law.  Similarly, when one 
aims to advance an argument that is grounded in fundamental Pragmatist doctrine, one would be 
required to operate within the 2
nd
-dimension of law.  And, finally, when one looks to advance an 
argument that is grounded in fundamental Natural Law doctrine, one would be required to 
operate within the 3
rd
-dimension of law.  It follows from this that if one chooses to advance 
certain arguments while operating within a dimension whose fundamental doctrine is such that it 
conflicts with that argument, the argument will be mistaken.  Ultimately, each dimension, 
consisting of a different theoretical perspective, is a unique vantage point by which one may 
view law, and an amalgamation of these dimensions provides a way by which one can embark on 
a path towards a more complete and unified theory of law. 
 
2.2.1 The Importance of Other Fields of Study to Legal Theory 
The nature of legal theory is such that it may be illuminated through the use of other 
fields of study.  In Legality, Shapiro helpfully explains the importance of other fields of study by 
drawing an analogy between the study of law and the study of water.
116
  Shapiro states: 
In some instances, conceptual analysis can be completed only by 
consulting a scientific theory.  For example, the analysis of the 
concept of WATER tells us that something is water just in case it has 
the same internal structure as the stuff that is in the lakes, rivers, 
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and oceans that we see around us.  But the concept alone does not 
specify what the internal structure of water is (the ancient Greeks 
grasped the concept of WATER even though they didn’t know that 
water is H20).  In order to know the internal structure of water, one 
must look to the a posteriori theory that tells us about the inner 
structure of material bodies, namely, chemistry.  To give a more 
complete answer to the question “What is water?” therefore, one 
must look to a scientific theory that tells us about the constitution 
of water.
117
 
 
Shapiro goes on to note that Hart began to do just this, leaning on what Hart called ‘descriptive 
sociology’ in The Concept of Law,118 but that the field of sociology has its limits with respect to 
what it can aid one in understanding about the nature of law.
119
  So in having identified these 
limits, Shapiro formed grounds to suggest other fields of study that will be both useful and 
needed in explaining a more complete theory of law.  In his view, a view I think correct, it is 
both useful and necessary to lean on certain scientific fields of study.  For his part, Shapiro 
engaged with and leaned on the study of human psychology and human character, leading to the 
conclusion that humans are planning creatures.  This, in turn, led to a deeper theory of law as 
plans. 
 For this project, a similar acceptance of the limits of a purely sociological explanation of 
law will be apparent, and a similar acceptance of the need to lean on other fields of study, 
especially scientific fields of study, will take place.  The complexity of legal theory is such that it 
is multi-layered, or what I will explain as being multi-dimensional.  But in order to understand 
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the dimensional character of law, I will need to lean on the scientific field of theoretical physics 
just as Hart leaned on sociology and Shapiro on psychology.  As Shapiro explained with his 
theory of law as plans, the exercise will be more than simply one of analogy.  It will be 
foundational in that the concepts and principles infused within the field of theoretical physics 
with respect to spatial dimensions will come to underpin the theory of law as dimensions. 
 
2.2.2 Gaining Insight from Theoretical Physics and Spatial Dimensions 
Borrowing tools from other disciplines of study can significantly assist one in elucidating 
a more complete theory of various phenomena.  To better clarify what is meant by ‘dimensions’, 
it is instructive to draw upon the field of theoretical physics and that discipline’s explanation and 
use of spatial dimensions.  In this regard, and to aid in understanding the power of spatial 
dimensions, I will draw upon the work of Michio Kaku, a world renowned theoretical physicist 
and highly respected expert in the discipline of string-field theory, a field that he co-founded.  
One of Kaku’s greatest gifts is his ability to explain highly complex physics based concepts and 
ideas to the layperson.  His examples and analogies are especially helpful, and I will thus borrow 
from them to illuminate law’s dimensions. 
In his book titled Hyperspace,
120
 Kaku explains that in order for one to be able to fully 
resolve physics based problems, one must resort to viewing the universe in a dimensional way.
121
  
In the words of Kaku, 
To understand how adding higher dimensions can simplify physical 
problems, consider the following example:  To the ancient Egyptians, the 
weather was a complete mystery.  What caused the seasons?  Why did it 
get warmer as they traveled south? … The weather was impossible to 
explain from the limited vantage point of the ancient Egyptians, to whom 
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the earth appeared flat, like a two-dimensional plane. But now imagine 
sending the Egyptians in a rocket into outer space, where they can see the 
earth as a simple whole in its orbit around the sun.  Suddenly, the 
answers to these questions become obvious. 
 
From outer space, it is clear that the earth’s axis is tilted. … Hence we 
have winter and summer.  And since the equator receives more sunlight 
then the northern or southern polar regions, it becomes warmer as we 
approach the equator.
122
 
 
Kaku’s main point is actually quite simple: until one views the world through each of the 
different spatial dimensions, certain physics based problems will remain unanswerable 
definitively.  One may speculate as to the reasons why certain physical phenomena occur, but 
one will ultimately be unable to give a definitive response to the problem.  One will not have 
access to the true reasons as to why certain things exist as they do.  This is because each different 
dimension provides a special vantage point by which one may view phenomena.  For physics, 
each spatial dimension provides a unique way by which individuals may view physical 
phenomena such as space.  For law, in a similar way, each legal dimension provides a unique 
way by which individuals may view law. 
 Kaku provides another useful example that illustrates how spatial dimensions aid in 
bringing about heightened levels of clarity and thus coherence.
123
  Kaku states that when 
analyzing phenomena, the adding of a dimension, 
[c]an make things simpler. ... The great Roman wars, often 
involving many smaller battlefields, were invariably fought with 
great confusion. … With battles raging on several fronts, Roman 
generals were often operating blind. … That is why one of the first 
principles of warfare is to seize high ground–that is, go up into the 
third dimension, above the two-dimensional battlefield.  From the 
vantage point of a large hill with a panoramic view of the 
battlefield, the chaos of war suddenly becomes vastly reduced.  In 
other words, viewed from the third dimension... the confusion of 
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the smaller battlefields becomes integrated into a coherent single 
picture.
124
 
 
Kaku’s example is indicative of the fact that dimensions assist in an analysis of phenomena in 
such a way that greater levels of coherence are achievable.  In other words, they assist in 
reducing confusion and fragmentation.  Ultimately, the dimensions of law, once understood as 
together aiming to bring about a more coherent depiction of law, have the potential to assist in 
decreasing confusion and fragmentation within legal theory and amongst legal theorists, and may 
even provide the basis to begin building a clearer conception of the nature of law. 
 There is one final point in this regard that requires some initial emphasis.  While the 
different dimensions involve different vantage points and are therefore distinct from one another, 
they are also related to one another.  For spatial dimensions, each shares a relationship to space.  
For law’s dimensions, each not only shares a relationship with the law, but they also share a 
relationship with time.  Law’s dimensions are thus appropriately labelled time-based dimensions.  
Now, the time aspect of law’s dimensions not only relates them to one another, but also provides 
a point of distinction between them.  Each dimension of law utilizes time in a specific way and is 
therefore defined accordingly.  But before one is able to understand how each dimension is to be 
defined according to time, one must first come to understand, what I call, ‘The Basic Elements of 
Time’. 
 
2.3 The Basic Elements of Time 
If one delves deeper into law’s dimensions, one will come to engage with the basic 
elements of time.  In philosophy, or specifically within a subset of philosophy known as the 
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philosophy of time, this type of subject matter is often referred to as the topology of time.
125
  
When I speak of the basic elements of time within law and law’s dimensions, it will be a slightly 
modified version of the ‘standard typology of time’.126  The standard typology holds that “[t]ime 
should be represented by a single, straight, non-branching, continuous line that extends without 
end in each of its two directions.”127  For the purposes of this project, the standard typology will 
be modified such that time does not continue without end in both directions, but instead that it 
continues without end in only one direction.  That direction is forward, or towards the present 
day, in legal time.  The reason for this is that if one is to proceed in the other direction, that being 
backwards in legal time, conceptually one will eventually come to an endpoint that represents the 
beginning of legal time.  This end point can be seen as aligning in parallel to the standard 
topology of time, just not extending ad infinitum as it would if it was actually within the standard 
typology of time.  Applying such a modification is logically sound because at a more general 
level of abstraction, one can envision a point in time where law, no matter how basic in form, 
actually began. This is so and independent of the fact that one cannot envision the same for the 
standard typology.  And, I believe, it need not trouble one that law may have begun at different 
times for different legal systems.  All that matters is that law in a general sense has a starting 
point; that being when the indicia of legal norms crystalize into such. 
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 Now, using the basic elements of time in a foundational sense, i.e. to establish a 
foundation for a theory of law and in an attempt to further illuminate the nature of law, 
constitutes a novel enterprise.
128
  Its uniqueness, however, should not detract from its 
significance, for that uniqueness is born amongst similar themes.  Notions of time have proved 
important in explaining aspects of almost all theories of law
129
 (for example, analyzing when in 
time a law becomes a law both legislatively and through judge made law).
130
  Nonetheless, the 
idea of using the basic elements of time to help ground a broader theory of law is a neoteric one.  
With this in mind, it would appear that I am venturing into somewhat unchartered territory, and 
thus must take extra care to be clear in explaining the basic elements of time.  The arguments to 
come may appear unorthodox in methodology, especially when compared to more traditional 
methodologies adopted by legal theorists in the past.  That said, it remains true that the elements 
of time themselves are rather uncontroversial.  Indeed, most phenomena that one might come to 
study may be, in some way, related to or flow from these elements, even if just as a point of 
reference.  It follows that the various uses of the elements may or may not be different depending 
on the phenomena that is the object of one’s study.  Of this, one may object, arguing that if there 
is variation in application, the elements shed their cloak of foundational meaning.  Such an 
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argument, however, is misguided, for it is the very ability of the elements to ground theories, or 
in other words their universal nature with respect to subject matter, that renders them useful.   
 For this project’s purposes, there are three basic elements of time and each will be 
recognized as unique in content and attaching to its own dimension of law.
131
  A crucial aspect of 
the elements is that no two may exist together within the same dimension; such would be 
conceptually impossible for each element is analytically distinct from each other.  In addition, 
with respect to each dimension, the element attached thereto performs three main functions:  
1) a coordinating function – it aids in properly coordinating the theoretical paradigm 
corresponding to it within broader legal theory;  
 
2) a defining function – it gives one access to an identifying label for each dimension; 
and  
 
3) a delimitation function – it carves out the scope of powers with respect to the 
corresponding dimensions. 
  The discussion above, I hope, has been useful in explaining what I mean by the basic 
elements of time.  The discussion, however, was general and abstract.  For the idea to be more 
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useful, certain specifics are needed.  Therefore, I now turn from the generalities to discuss the 
specifics of each of the three elements.
132
 
 
2.3.1 The First Element of Time: The Single Point in Time 
The first element of time is the point in time.  While it is true that there are innumerable 
points in time, it is only when one speaks of a specific point in time that one may be said to be 
speaking of the first element of time.  When one uses the first element of time in analysis, one is 
taking a more focused view of the object in study.  Correspondingly, there are certain properties 
intrinsic to this type of analysis that aids in achieving a more in-depth study of an object.  It is 
these two things together that form a specific dimension, the 1
st
-dimension. 
Now, when the object of study is the nature of law, one can draw upon the first element 
of time to engage in a specific type of study – a study of the 1st-dimension of law.  In this 
dimension, law is analyzed as it exists at any one specific point in time.  When analyzed in this 
way, certain intrinsic properties of the dimension become apparent.  These properties correspond 
to the different theses of Positivism (I will defend this assertion more fully in Chapter 3), which 
may be seen as flowing from the vantage point imposed by the point in time.   
An example may help bring clarity.  Generally speaking, in common law systems, law is 
made in two ways:  
1) through legislation; and 
 
2) through the decisions of judges. 
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When a legislature, through its appropriate channels and procedures, passes a bill, the result is a 
piece of legislation that exists in law as law.  So long as that legislation remains in effect as is 
(i.e. is not amended, repealed, struck for being unconstitutional, etc.), that legislation will remain 
law.  Take for example the segregation laws that existed in the United States, commonly referred 
to as ‘Jim Crow’ laws.  At one point in time, these laws were valid laws, yet at another point in 
time they were rendered unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court and therefore were 
no longer valid laws.
133
  This demonstrates that at two different points in time, the state of the 
law was drastically different; in fact, mirror opposites of one another.  At one point, segregation 
was allowed under the banner of equality, and at another it was not allowed under the same.  
What should be apparent is that depending on the point in time that one chooses to analyze such 
a law, the data available for that analysis, as a matter of fact separate and apart from the state of 
the law, will be quite different.  The reason for this is the vantage point conferred by the first 
element of time, the point in time. 
 
2.3.2 The Second Element of Time: The Time Between Two Adjacent Points in 
Time (i.e. The Change in Time) 
The second element of time is unique from the first in that it allows for analysis pursuant 
to the properties intrinsic to a change in time as opposed to a single point in time.  One would, 
again, be correct in noting that there are innumerable changes in time, but the second element is 
not concerned with the changes in aggregate.  It is only concerned with one single specific 
change in time at any one time.  Additionally, it is not simply the fact of the change that is the 
element’s focus (that would be the focus of the first element), but instead the process by which 
the change takes place.  Therefore, in focusing on the process, one commits to attempting to 
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understand not what change took place, but how that change took place.  The exercise is 
descriptive and not evaluative in nature.
134
 
It will prove instructive to again engage with an example.  Revisiting the previous one 
will do.  When the United States Supreme Court found the segregation laws in the United States 
to be unconstitutional, the decision resulted in a change in the law.  The change occurred because 
of a decision of the judges of that Court.  If one chooses to analyze the process by which the 
judges came to that decision, one will be viewing the law through the properties of the second 
element of time; or, in other words, one be viewing the law from the vantage point of the 2
nd
-
dimension of law.  Again, a defense of this assertion will not take place here, for it will be left to 
Chapter 4.  But what should be noted now is that the intrinsic properties that flow from the 
second element, and thus correspond to the 2
nd
-dimension of law, are those of Pragmatism.  
Thusly, it will be my contention that when judges go about making decisions, they do so 
Pragmatically, as that term will be so explained.  This contention will be supported by an 
analysis of the legal reasoning of lawyers and the adversarial nature of common law systems of 
law. 
 A similar example can be made with respect to legislation.  In the United States, after the 
American Civil War, the Federal Government passed the Thirteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution which ended slavery.  The Amendment was subsequently ratified by each of 
the states.  Ultimately, what resulted from the decision to pass the Amendment and ratify it was a 
change in the law.  The change occurred, as all do, as the result of a decision to act.  But 
ultimately it is the process by which that change took place that may be analyzed through the 2
nd
-
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dimension of law by the analytical powers conferred by the second element of time, the change 
in time.
135
   
The second element then (and consequently the 2
nd
-dimension of law), is about decision 
making that effects the incremental changes in the law over time, and it is the great span of all of 
these decisions, both judicial and legislative, that leads us into the third element of time. 
 
2.3.3 The Third Element of Time: From the Beginning of (the relevant) Time 
to the Ever Changing Present Day (i.e. The Span of Time) 
The third and final element of time is again different and unique from both the first and 
second elements.  As opposed to looking at specific instances of an object at a more micro-level, 
the third element provides for a vantage point that spans the entire spectrum of an object on a 
more macro-level.  It allows an object to be analyzed from its beginnings to its end, or for objects 
like law that continue on in time in virtual perpetuity, from its beginnings to its ever changing 
present day.  Some phenomena are continual in nature – law is one of these types of phenomena 
– and they will thus span over a length of time and continue spanning.   
The third element of time is, in a sense, a more abstract and full view of an object of 
study.  When this element is invoked, the minute details and specifics of the object as may be 
viewed through the first and second elements and their corresponding dimensions are blurred.  
And, because of this, the descriptive analyst must turn to identifying themes, broad 
goals/objectives, etc. that may begin to become apparent.  It is this broad vantage point, 
conferred by the third element of time, that underpins the 3
rd
-dimension of law.   
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Unfortunately, I cannot offer any example at this point similar to that which I did for the 
first and second elements, or in any event one that will be as readily useful.  Because the element 
requires one to move to a higher level of abstraction, examples will be necessarily abstract.  In 
my view, these types of examples are clearer when placed amongst other arguments in order to 
provide some context.  Such will come later on in this project (Chapter 5) and, therefore, I will 
save any examples in this regard for then. 
With respect to a corresponding theoretical paradigm, the paradigm that corresponds to 
the 3
rd
-dimension, by way of the third element, is Naturalism.  The third element of time and the 
theses of Naturalism combine to form the 3
rd
-dimension of law.  I will defend this position in 
Chapter 5, where it will eventually be argued that concepts of morality and moral reasoning are 
integral to this 3
rd
-dimension of law. 
 
2.4 Theory or ‘Meta-Theory’ 
A mild detour from the discussions of time and dimensions is in order to ponder an issue 
that seems to follow from a theory of law as dimensions.  One may begin to wonder whether or 
not a theory of this kind is really a theory of law at all or whether, instead, it is merely a theory of 
(legal) theory.  Is the exercise one of conventional theorization, or perhaps more one of ‘meta-
theory’?   Although dwelling on such a query has quick limits in terms of practical usefulness, 
especially with respect to this project, in my view it is nevertheless an important question that 
should be addressed, and so I turn now to address it. 
In truth, the query as I have framed it is somewhat misleading, for I have framed it as an 
‘either/or’ question when in fact a theory of law as dimensions is both a conventional theory of 
law and a meta-theory, with the former being a natural consequence of the latter.  On the face of 
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it, a theory of law as dimensions may more appropriately be considered a meta-theory because it 
proffers a way by which one may begin to reconcile theoretical perspectives that have 
historically come into conflict with one another.  In this way, it is a theory about theory, or more 
accurately, a theory about how to best understand and utilize the theoretical paradigms within the 
discipline of legal theory itself.  With that said, if one is to take a deeper look at some of the 
consequences that entail from the development of such a theory, one will notice, as a fact, that a 
unique theory of law begins to develop as a direct result of the meta-theory.  Since the meta-
theory changes the way by which we view the different paradigms of legal theory, the result may 
be said to be a new theory of law in a more conventional and analytical sense.   
 
2.5 Hume’s Law, the Derivative Law, and the Three Questions 
By now, the gist of this project is starting to take shape.  The aim is to give some fresh 
perspective to the question ‘what is law’ (the Primary Question) with the hopes that doing so will 
bring about enhanced clarity to the discipline of legal theory.  Additional perspective, in this 
regard, is made possible through the concept of law as dimensions.  So, having laid the 
groundwork for this concept, some final thoughts are in order before moving on to PART II of 
this project.  These thoughts require a revisitation of the notion of Hume’s Law and the three 
questions that were posed in the introduction to this project.   
The distinction between what law is and what law ought to be, two concepts integral to 
the Subsidiary and Secondary Questions, has been a point of contention between legal theorists, 
especially Positivists and Naturalists.  Much of this contention is owed to Hume’s Law and the 
Positivistic arguments based thereon.  As briefly touched upon in in Chapter 1, Hume stated that 
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a logical fallacy exists when one attempts to derive an ought from an is.
136
  Therefore, and as an 
example, it would be logically fallacious, without more, to argue that simply because it is a fact 
that a certain white picket fence exists around a house, that it follows that a white picket fence 
ought to exist around all houses.  The ‘ought’ in this instance cannot be logically derived from 
the ‘is’.  In a similar way, Hume’s Law has been used by Positivists as a way of challenging the 
fundamental tenets of Naturalism, mostly by way of the Separation Thesis.
137
  Naturalists, as has 
been pointed out, argue that all laws ought to be moral, else they not be valid laws, and 
Naturalists may point to various instances of laws being moral or immoral to buttress the 
argument.  The Positivistic attack on such an assertion goes something like this: although it may 
be the case that a law is moral (or immoral), it is logically fallacious, without more, to derive 
from this simple fact that all laws ought to be moral.
138
  This is because, to be plain, the 
reasoning is nonsensical. 
There is another line of reasoning intertwined in this riddle that one would do much good 
to untangle.  The above line of reasoning results in a related fallacy that, I think, truly gets to the 
root of the contention between Positivists and Naturalists.  I shall call this fallacy the Derivative 
Law, for it can be seen as a derivative of Hume’s Law.  Just as a logical fallacy exists when one 
attempts to derive an ought from an is, a related fallacy (the Derivative Law) exists when one 
attempts to argue for what something is or is not by arguing for what it ought or ought not be.  In 
other words, the Derivative Law stands for the proposition that one cannot explain/define/ 
describe what something is (or is not) by instead explaining/defining/describing what that thing 
ought to be (or ought not to be).  The two lines of argument are of a distinct kind, both in form 
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and substance.  So, for example and as the Positivists would contend, it is mistaken to state that 
an existing immoral law is not a law simply because it ought to be moral.  Naturalism, one might 
argue, is guilty of offending the Derivative Law for the law in the example exists, and it thus 
matters not whether one is able to proffer evaluative criticisms as to that law’s moral merit.  
Now, whether or not the criticism is sound is one thing, but even if sound, it cannot take away 
the fact that the law exists.   
The Derivative Law has important implications for not just legal theory, but also moral 
debate within legal theory, including implications with respect to the Tertiary Question.  As one 
may remember from the introduction to this project, the Tertiary Question asks whether or not 
law has any necessary connection to morality.  The question, like most of this type, suggests two 
potential answers: firstly, yes law does have a necessary connection to morality; or, secondly, no 
it does not.  The two answers are opposed to one another, indicating a choice must be made 
between them.  In legal theory, this line has been drawn and choices have been made, which is 
why we have Naturalists (those who answered yes) and Positivists (those who answered no).  
What I will demonstrate in PART II, however, is that the more fitting answer to this question is 
both yes and no.  Naturally, objections at this point will be numerous and varied, for questions 
that spawn both yes and no answers are typically ones that also spawn paradoxical puzzles.  The 
Tertiary Question appears no different in this regard, and in the introduction this puzzle was 
dubbed the Paradox – i.e. that law both does and does not have a necessary connection to 
morality.  The Paradox, however, is illusory, and I will show why this is so through a 
reconceptualization of the is/ought dilemma, with that reconceptualization taking the form of the 
solutions to the Primary and Secondary Questions.   
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To help tease out the merits of this reconceptualization, I leave one, for now, with this.  
The Primary Question = what is law?  The Derivative Law teaches that it is incoherent to argue 
for what something is by instead arguing for what that thing ought to be.  It follows that one 
cannot answer the question what is law by instead arguing for what it ought to be, moral or 
otherwise.  But, I venture to posit, what if one answers the Primary Question with the following: 
law is the constant and consistent pursuit of what law ought to be.  The answer to this question 
will bring about profound implications for the nature of law, will support answers to each of the 
Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary questions, and will ultimately reveal the power of law as 
dimensions. 
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PART II: LAW AS DIMENSIONS  
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Chapter 3: The 1st-Dimension of Law – Law as it Exists at any One Point in 
Time 
 
 
Fig 1   
 The goal throughout the first two chapters, being PART I, was to lay the foundation for 
the remaining three chapters, being PART II, the likes of which undertakes a dimensional 
analysis of law.  The fundamentals that this type of analysis rests upon support the claim that law 
exists in three separate yet related time-based dimensions.   In this chapter, I concentrate on the 
first of these dimensions.   
65 
 
 Throughout PART I, I at times made reference to the fact that the foundational theses of 
Positivism, and more particularly the Social Fact Thesis, the Sources Thesis, and the Separation 
Thesis coalesce with the intrinsic properties of the 1
st
-dimension of law.  Indeed, these theses 
integrate with the unique time-based element that corresponds to the 1
st
-dimension of law, with 
that time based element being the ‘point in time’.  It is with this backdrop that I turn to discuss 
the various intricacies of the 1
st
-dimension of law, including why it is Positivistic in nature. 
 
3.1 Gardner and Positivism as a Thesis 
In Chapter 1, Positivism was understood as claiming to be a theoretical paradigm within 
the discipline of legal theory whose purpose it is to expound a complete theory of the nature of 
law.  A theory of law as dimensions, however, takes Positivism not to be a complete theory, but 
instead to be one aspect of a more robust theory of the nature of law.  In my view, it is useful in 
this regard to draw on the work of John Gardner, a self-identifying Exclusive Positivist,
139
 as he 
makes an important concession regarding Positivism which supports the theory of law as 
dimensions. 
In his Law as a Leap of Faith,
140
 Gardner acknowledges an important limit of Positivism 
and the Positivistic theses.
141
  The acknowledgment is found in one of the first chapters of the 
book, which is based on a previously published article titled “Legal Positivism: 5 ½ Myths”.142  
Gardner (I think correctly) concedes that Positivism is not and cannot be a complete account of 
the nature of law.  In his words: 
                                                 
139
 Gardner supra note 3 at 22. 
140
 Ibid. 
141
 Ibid at 33. 
142
 Ibid. 
66 
 
Legal positivism is not a whole theory of law’s nature … .  It is a 
thesis about legal validity [comprising a bundle of theses], which is 
compatible with any number of further theses about law’s nature, 
including the thesis that all valid law is by its nature subject to 
special moral objectives and imperatives on its own.
143
 
 
The concession is important, for it properly recognizes that Positivism is simply a thesis in and 
of itself, and not a theory of law per se.  Its importance, therefore, to a more robust theory of the 
nature of law is directly related to what it, as a thesis, so claims.  But, beyond these claims, the 
Positivistic thesis is largely sterilized, and other theses must therefore take over to more fully 
explain the nature of law.  The true power of the concession is in full view once one is to be able 
to properly place the Positivistic claims, for example within a dimension, so that the placement 
illuminates not only the merit of the claims, but also the nature of law.  Ultimately then, in order 
to flourish for all it is, Positivism would do well to be characterized as a thesis attributable to a 
dimension within a dimensional analysis of the law, and not a standalone account of the nature of 
law. 
 A second argument by Gardner, however, has potential to cause this project some trouble.  
Gardner includes as one of his 5 ½ myths of Positivism the claim that law has no necessary 
connection to morality.
144
  In fact, he states that attributing this claim to Positivism is ‘absurd’ 
and that “[n]o legal philosopher of note has ever endorsed it as it stands.”145  Gardner states that,  
[t]here are many… connections between law and morality… and 
[Positivists] have often taken great pains to assert them.  Hobbes, 
Bentham, Austin, Kelsen, Hart, Raz, and Coleman all rely on at 
least some more substantial necessary connections between law 
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and morality in explaining various aspects of the nature of law 
(although they do not all rely on the same ones).
146
 
 
The argument is potentially troublesome because the basis of the Separation Thesis holds the 
exact opposite, meaning that there is no necessary connection between law and morality.  The 
trouble, however, is quite easily averted once one understands the following: Positivism is 
simply a thesis and not a complete theory of law; the Separation Thesis as defined is part of the 
Positivistic thesis; and the Positivistic thesis is but one component of a complete theory of law as 
dimensions, with the 1
st
-dimension of law insisting on a necessary distinction between law and 
morality or, in other words, insisting that there is no necessary connection between law and 
morality.  In understanding this, Gardner’s claim, while true in a sense, is also misleading in 
another.  The truth is that the Separation Thesis holds absolutely true in the 1
st
-dimension of law 
because from the vantage point of this dimension it is readily apparent that law has no necessary 
connection to morality.  And because the 1
st
-dimension of law is Positivistic, the Positivistic 
claim that law has no necessary connection to morality is actually no myth at all.  In the 
discussion that follows, the reasons for why this is so will become apparent. 
  
3.2 The Separation of Law and Morality in the 1st-Dimension of Law 
One of the fundamental theses of Positivism is the Separation Thesis, an overview of 
which was undertaken in Chapter 1.  Because the thesis is fundamental, it follows that if one is to 
claim that a dimension is grounded in Positivism, such as is the case for the 1
st
-dimension of law, 
it must be the case that the Separation Thesis holds true in that dimension.  It thus falls on me to 
successfully argue that the Separation Thesis holds true in the 1
st
-dimension of law, and to aid in 
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making this argument, I will look to the work of the celebrated Positivist H.L.A. Hart for 
support. 
As mentioned, in Hart’s article “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals”,147 
Hart famously argued that there is a necessary distinction between law and morality and, thusly, 
that there is no necessary connection between law and morality.
148
  In making this argument, 
Hart used a combination of two different approaches.  Firstly, he began by defending the 
positions of some key utilitarian proponents of the Separation Thesis, namely Jeremy Bentham 
and John Austin.
149
  Secondly, he proceeded to moderate his argument by criticizing those 
identical proponents for advocating other flawed theses, most importantly Austin’s command 
theory of law.
150
  In approaching the argument in this way, Hart was able to point out a key 
distinction in certain criticisms of Bentham and Austin.  Hart stressed that although the 
utilitarians had been criticized for what they claimed to be sound theoretical doctrines – criticism 
that even Hart, to an extent, agreed with – the critics nevertheless all made one fatal flaw.151  
Those critics, argued Hart, wrongly assumed that since one of the utilitarian doctrines could be 
proven to be false, it followed that all of the doctrines must also be taken to be false.
152
  
Logically, Hart’s argument with respect to the flaw was certainly sound and I take no quarrel 
with it; however, the argument requires qualification with respect to how it relates to the 
Separation Thesis’ connection to the 1st-dimension of law.  That qualification is that the 
Separation Thesis can only absolutely hold true within the 1
st
-dimension of law.  This follows 
from the fact that Positivism is simply a thesis itself attributable to this dimension. 
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The 1
st
-dimension of law is to be conceptualized as law as it exists at any one point in 
time.  The 1
st
-dimension, in essence, is akin to taking a snapshot of the law as it exists along a 
time-based continuum.  When conceptualized in this way, it becomes clear that law can only be 
explained for what it is and, conversely, cannot be explained by arguing for what it ought to be.  
This is because of Hume’s Law and more specifically the Derivative Law, being that a logical 
fallacy is apparent in the reasoning of one attempting to explain what something is by instead 
explaining what it ought to be.  This, in turn, accords with the Separation Thesis, because it 
separates arguments about what is from what (morally) ought to be. 
In addition, when law is viewed through the 1
st
-dimension (i.e. at any one single point in 
time), it is clear that law and morality do not necessarily coincide.  Hart himself provided the 
useful example of laws that have allowed for the ownership of slaves.
153
  Such laws are not 
considered moral, yet they have nevertheless existed as valid laws.
154
  Put another way, at 
various points throughout history, the state of the law has allowed for the ownership of slaves 
even though the act of owning a slave is generally considered immoral; and, in contrast, at other 
points in history, there have existed laws that prohibit the ownership of slaves and such 
prohibitions are generally considered moral.  The state of law then, simply put, is the state of the 
law, and judgment as to the merits or demerits of any one law’s moral content, in the 1st-
dimension, does not affect that law’s validity as law.  It follows that Naturalism’s Validity Thesis 
and NCT must be rejected in the 1
st
-dimension of law, for it would be logically incoherent to 
argue otherwise.  
There are many other examples to make the point plain.  Let us return to the example of 
segregation laws first noted in Chapter 2.  It is clear that at certain points in time there were 
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segregation laws on the books of certain states in the United States.
155
  These laws are generally 
considered immoral laws for they negatively affected racial minorities in a disproportionate way, 
resulting in what may be considered gross inequality.  That said, even though the laws were 
immoral, they still existed as valid laws at the times they were in force.  Eventually, however, 
these same laws were found to be unconstitutional,
156
 and this outcome is generally considered to 
be moral, resulting in a more moral state of the law, but this fact does not negate the fact that 
there were, at other points in time, immoral segregation laws.  In other words, the moral state of 
the law at one point in time cannot erase the fact that there was an immoral state of the law at 
other points in time (and vice-versa).  The result is a necessary rejection of the Validity Thesis 
and NCT in the 1
st
- dimension of law, a dimension focused solely on law as it exists at any one 
point in time. 
 The above examples demonstrate that while at any single point in time there may be 
some intersections between certain laws sand morality (e.g. the desegregation decisions and the 
movement towards increased equality being generally considered moral), such intersections will 
not necessarily be found between all laws and morality at other times.  This is consistent with 
Positivism’s Separation Thesis and, as will now be explained, both the Sources Thesis and Social 
Fact Thesis.  Such is the nature of law in the 1
st
-dimension. 
 
3.3 The Three Theses of the Positivism Thesis 
As has already been explained, the Sources Thesis and the Social Fact Thesis hold that all 
laws exist as social fact because they are brought into existence through social sources (e.g. 
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legislatures, judges, etc.).  Now, in a dimensional analysis of law, because of the element of time 
in the 1
st
-dimension of law (i.e. the point in time), the Social Fact Thesis and Sources Thesis may 
be combined to form a better representative thesis that I call the ‘Historical Fact Thesis’.  This is 
because not only does law naturally flow from social sources, but it also exists, in the 1
st
-
dimension, at any single historical point in time.  When one takes a ‘snapshot’ of the law at any 
one point in time, one is taking a snapshot of the past and therefore a historical snapshot.  The 
snapshot itself is coloured by both its social source and its historical nature.  At the same time 
however, one cannot take a snapshot of the law in the future, or a snapshot of a future state of the 
law, as this would merely be an exercise in speculation or at best informed speculation.  One 
may guess as to what any one law might be or what the state of the law may trend toward, and 
from this one may further argue the merits or demerits of that hypothetical law or the 
hypothetical state of the law – and to a certain extent, this is what legislatures in fact do – but the 
hypothesizing about what the law might be or arguing as to what the law ought to be is very 
different from identifying what the law is.  Law is identified by reference to the social sources 
that create it and thereby solidify it as social and historical fact (this, again, was outlined in 
greater detail in Chapter 1).
157
  Ultimately then, because existence of any fact is necessarily a 
historical inquiry, all laws when viewed through the 1
st
-dimension are historical as well as social 
and exist regardless of whether or not they are considered moral.  Or, put another way, a law’s 
existence is one of social pedigree which manifests as historical fact, with issues as to that law’s 
moral characterization not affecting that law’s ultimate existence.   
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Having said all this, I must unpack, I think, the idea of morality and moral 
characterization a bit more if one is to be able to more fully understand the nature of the 1
st
-
dimension of law.  It is true that one can characterize a law as either moral or immoral, but one 
cannot and does not know whether a law is moral or immoral in character unless and until one 
evaluates the moral merits of that law.  Such an exercise engages in moral criticism and moral 
reasoning.  One might argue that the ability to engage in such an exercise proves that, within the 
1
st
-dimension of law, there is a necessary connection between law and morality, for if one is to 
understand whether a connection exists, one must first engage in moral reasoning.  Such a belief, 
however, is misguided because the moral exercise is not attributable to the 1
st
-dimension of law.  
It is an exercise outside the dimension, forming aspects (as will be seen) of other dimensions.  It 
must be emphasized that if an immoral (or a moral) evaluation is attributable to a law, one made 
pursuant to moral authority, such will have no effect on the fact of the law’s existence.  Indeed, 
such an evaluation is merely a characterization of the fact – and, of course, the fact of existence 
means the thing exists.  
Any evaluation is potentially subject to change over time as one engages in re-evaluation.  
It follows that any characterization is also subject to this principle of transience.  Therefore, our 
evaluations about (and our characterizations of) certain laws at any single point in time may be 
different as compared to another point in time.  This is true, and is quite easily demonstrated by 
quick reference to the slavery and segregation examples above.  But all of this does not change 
the underlying fact that law in the 1
st
-dimension of law has no necessary connection to morality.  
A distinction, of one sort or another, between the two remains.  Moral criticism, reasoning, 
evaluation, and characterizations have a necessary connection to morality (and perhaps other 
73 
 
dimensions of law), but in the 1
st
-dimension of law they have no impact whatsoever on a law, the 
state of the law, or ultimately the nature of law in that dimension. 
But this still is not the end of it.  It is also of course true that laws typically change 
because individuals proffer arguments supported by reasons for change, and then applicable 
authorities choose to implement the change based on the supported arguments.  Much of the time 
the reasons for change will be grounded in moral reasoning, using concepts of justice and 
injustice, and may be offered in support of a movement towards the greater good or an increased 
level of justice.  Such being the case, one may be led to believe that because there are changes in 
the law at certain points in time that result from moral reasoning, it must follow that the 1
st
-
dimension of law has a necessary connection to morality.  This reasoning, however, would again 
be misguided.  The processes by which the law changes and by which individuals influence 
changes do not form part of the 1
st
-dimension of law.  Considerations of these changes are part 
and parcel of other dimensions of law.  Again, the 1
st
-dimension of law is a micro-view of the 
law, with considerations of changes in the law being outside the scope of this view.  In other 
words, changes to the law are not what one is concerned with when viewing the law through the 
vantage point of the 1
st
-dimension.  This is not to suggest that such considerations do not 
inextricably link law to morality in another way.  It indeed may, but such would no longer be a 
discussion of the nature of law in the 1
st
-dimension.  It would be a discussion of a different type, 
to take place within a different dimension, pursuant to a different element of time.  Again, the 
element of time that corresponds to the 1
st
-dimension of law is the element of the point in time.  
The 1
st
-dimension is therefore not concerned with changes in time, but is instead concerned with 
the social and historical fact of law, with each fact linking directly to a point in time.  Therefore, 
while it is true that changes which are a result of moral criticism and moral reasoning do affect 
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certain dimensions (e.g. the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 dimensions of law), they do not affect the 1
st
-dimension.  
To blur the line between the dimensions would be to mistakenly conflate different components of 
the nature of law.  This is an unnecessary obfuscation and, when the goal is to better explain 
certain phenomena (a goal this project shares), unnecessary obfuscation is to be avoided.  
Ultimately then, such conflation is to be rejected. 
 
3.3.1 Finnis and Law as Fact 
The prior discussion led to the conclusion that law, in the 1
st
-dimension of law, exists as 
both social and historical fact.  Additional support for this view is found in an article by the 
Naturalist John Finnis, which was recently republished in a collection of his works on the 
philosophy of law.
158
  Finnis states: 
[E]veryone knows that there have been and are – it’s a matter of 
fact – rules laid down as laws, and described by makers and 
subjects alike as law, which were and are deeply unreasonable, 
unjust, immoral; it can happen that some of them do not even 
profess to be reasonable, just, or morally decent.  …  As a matter 
of fact, there is no necessary connection between arguments and 
logic or validity as argumentation; arguments worthless as 
argument – as reasons for a conclusion – can be found all over the 
place.  As a matter of reason, an invalid argument is no argument.  
Again, as a matter of fact, there is no necessary connection … 
between law and reasonableness, justice or morality… .159 
 
Finnis can be seen here as accepting that law exists as fact, but as categorizing this fact as a 
special view of law.  It is a factual view and a way by which one may describe law, but it does 
not necessarily explain a full account of the nature of law.  Therefore, for Finnis, this factual 
component does no harm to a Naturalistic account of the nature of law, for it is a different type of 
account of the nature of law altogether.  This makes sense and accords with a theory of law as 
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dimensions, for the theory makes room for both Positivistic and Naturalistic theses (as well as 
Pragmatist theses).  It makes such room by recognizing various layers of dimensions, and then 
properly restricting the paradigms and their fundamental theses to their particular dimension. 
 
3.4 The Relationship between the Separation Thesis and the Other Dimensions 
Having discussed the three fundamental theses of Positivism and their relationship to the 
1
st
-dimension of law, more may be said on the relationship between the Separation Thesis and 
the other two dimensions of law. 
 
3.4.1 The Separation Thesis and Its Relationship to the 2nd-Dimension of Law 
Although the 2
nd
-dimension of law will be discussed more fully in Chapter 4, it will 
prove useful at this point to discuss how the Separation Thesis relates to it.  In particular, it will 
be useful to see how the Separation Thesis is actually a natural consequence of the nature of law 
in the 2
nd
-dimension of law, specifically the process of judicial decision making.
160
  The 2
nd
-
dimension of law is to be conceptualized as the time between two points in time or, more 
specifically for the purposes of this project, the time over which a case consisting of legal issues 
is adjudicated.  During this time, judges engage Pragmatism to decide cases.  Judges, however, 
are human beings and as human beings are certainly not infallible.  Any one judge’s decision at 
any one time may not always be morally sound, nor may that decision be considered by some to 
be moral in character.  In addition, the content of the legal issues may be such that no moral 
decision is available for the judge.  Nevertheless, while a judicial decision may at times be 
considered ‘wrong’ and/or ‘immoral’, or what one may call bad law or law that ought not to be 
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 I make no distinction between the terms ‘adjudication’ and ‘decision making’.  I use them interchangeably 
throughout this process to fend off monotony.   
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followed, the decision itself will still be considered law (assuming, of course, a higher level 
court, if given the opportunity, chooses not to overrule that judge’s decision and/or the 
legislature chooses not to pass legislation that nullifies the law following from that decision).
161
  
Now, if one were to take a snapshot of the law after one of these wrong/immoral decisions is 
handed down, the law at that specific point in time, viewed now through the 1
st
-dimension of 
law, would not have any connection to morality for it would be immoral in nature.  Since the law 
in such a situation is separated from morality in the 1
st
-dimension of law, it follows that the 
Separation Thesis proves true for that dimension. 
 
3.4.2 The Separation Thesis and Its Relationship to the 3rd-Dimension of Law 
It is instructive to note that the Separation Thesis does not hold true for this dimension.  
A more complete analysis of why this is so will take place in Chapter 5, but for now a few points 
should be made.  The 3
rd
-dimension of law, defined as the time between law’s very first 
existence and the ever changing present day, is essentially diachronic, meaning the 3
rd
-dimension 
of law consists of the entire spectrum of changes that occur with respect to the law over time.  
Such changes occur because individuals within a system of law critically assess the state of the 
law at any one point in time and then reason that because of identified deficiencies, the law ought 
to be changed in certain ways.  When pursued, those changes are implemented with the goal of 
remedying deficiencies, thus converting what was once a position on what the law ought to be 
into a newly existent or changed law (i.e. a new state of what the law is).  The process is then 
repeated in perpetuity.  Therefore, because these individuals are constantly and consistently 
seeking out changes and attempting to implement changes to remedy deficiencies, in viewing 
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this pursuit from the 3
rd
-dimension (i.e. a view of the entire spectrum), law may be 
conceptualized as the constant and consistent pursuit of what law ought to be.  Because the goal 
of the pursuit is to remedy any and all deficiencies, motivated by an inherent desire to create a 
system of laws that more closely reflects an ‘ideal’ state of law (i.e. a state that is wholly just and 
therefore wholly moral),
162
 the overall pursuit may itself be considered a moral undertaking.
163
  
Therefore, because the pursuit is moral, morality pervades the 3
rd
-dimension of law and, 
consequently, in the 3
rd
-dimension of law the Separation Thesis must fail.   
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has been concerned with Positivism and the 1
st
-dimension of law.  The key 
component of this dimension, the component that explains why the fundamental Positivistic 
theses are true within the dimension, is the element of time that corresponds to the dimension: 
i.e. the point in time.  When law is viewed at any one single point in time, the Social Fact Thesis, 
Sources Thesis, and the Separation Thesis make complete and absolute sense, hold absolutely 
true, and thus prevail over Naturalism’s Validity Thesis and NCT.  As was shown, in the 1st-
dimension of law, there is simply no necessary connection between law and morality.  Law and 
morality in this dimension are distinct concepts.  This is largely due to the fact that the 
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 This concept will come to be known in Chapter 5 as the ‘General Goal of Legal Systems’ or the ‘General Goal’.  
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 It is prudent to stress that because of human fallibility, over any specific stretch of time the state of the law may 
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Ultimately, although human fallibility will preclude the actual achievement of the ideal state of law, as I will explain 
more fully in Chapter 5, it is the constant and consistent pursuit of that ideal state that is moral and that thereby 
provides the necessary connection between law and morality.  It why law, in the 3
rd
-dimension, is Naturalistic. 
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Separation Thesis is dependent upon the element of time being the point in time.  And it follows 
from this that because the point in time corresponds to the 1
st
-dimension of law, for the 
Separation Thesis to be absolutely sound, it must also be confined to the 1
st
-dimension of law.  
And so it is.  This is why the Tertiary Question posed in the Introduction to this project, the one 
leading to the Paradox (that law does and does not have a necessary connection to morality) can 
be answered, in one respect, with ‘no’; because in the 1st-dimenssion of law, there is no 
necessary connection between law and morality.  It is also why the solution to the Paradox is law 
as dimensions, because a dimensional analysis allows for a ‘no’ answer and, as one will later 
come to see, a ‘yes’ answer as well.  
Having illuminated the nature of law in the 1
st
-dimension of law, it is now time to turn to 
the 2
nd
-dimension of law to explain how this dimension is fundamentally Pragmatic.  This will 
require a change in vantage point from the point in time to the time between two points in time. 
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Chapter 4: The 2nd-Dimension of Law – Law as it Exists between Two 
Adjacent Points in Time 
 
 
Fig 2   
 The 2
nd
-dimension of law is to be conceptualized as the time between two points in legal 
time or what can otherwise be referred to as the time over which a case with legal issues is 
adjudicated.   Over the course of this chapter, I hope to demonstrate that due to the unique nature 
of our adjudicative systems, a phenomenon known as ‘legal binds’ occurs within the 2nd-
dimension of law.  It will therefore be important to discuss what is meant by a legal bind, how 
they manifest, how judges come to deal with them, and what judges ultimately do to dispose of 
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them.  I will argue that a pragmatic approach, based in the Pragmatic theses, is the actual way by 
which judges decide legal issues, as well as the only way by which they may sufficiently decide 
legal issues.  This, in turn, provides the reason why the 2
nd
-dimension of law is best explained 
and characterized by Pragmatism.   
 
4.1 The Double Bind and Multiple Bind Scenarios 
Two concepts central to the 2
nd
-dimension of law are the concepts of the double bind and 
the multiple bind.  It will be instructive then to begin with a discussion of these concepts.  In 
Chapter 1, it was noted that Radin discusses a concept known as the double bind with respect to 
feminist theory.
164
  Generally, a double bind occurs in feminism whenever there are competing 
social policies from which one must choose and yet no matter which policy is chosen, harm 
occurs.  Radin discusses the double bind as it pertains to the commodification of the sexuality of 
women.
165
  She argues that due to oppression, both the “[c]ommodification and 
noncommodification of [the sexuality of women] may be harmful”.166  This is due to the fact that 
commodification treats women as exchangeable goods, which is a threat to their personhood, and 
that noncommodification “[d]enies women the choice to market their sexual… services…”, 
which is also a threat to their personhood.
167
  Radin argues, in taking recognition of this reality, 
that the best way choose amongst the various alternatives (i.e. the best way to resolve the issue of 
the double bind), is to engage Pragmatism.
168
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Radin does not necessarily make the broader claim that double binds also occur in law 
with respect to legal decision making.  Indeed, her point is that double binds are pervasive 
throughout women’s issues due to oppression.169  Notwithstanding this more narrow application, 
a broader claim can and must be made.  The double bind is not exclusively a feminist issue.  
There are also ‘legal double binds’ and ‘legal multiple binds’ that pervade all decision making 
processes with respect to the law.  While Radin asserts that the feminist double bind arises from 
oppression,
170
 legal double and legal multiple binds arise from the fact that our legal system is 
adversarial in nature.  And, more specifically, the binds result from the unique reasoning that can 
be attributed to the lawyers functioning within such systems.  These assertions will be defended 
throughout this chapter, beginning with the assertion that there is something unique about the 
reasoning of lawyers.  With this in mind, I turn to analyze the legal reasoning of lawyers, how 
that reasoning may be contrasted with that of judges, and its importance to the nature of law. 
 
4.1.1 Hart’s Problems of the Penumbra and the Legal Reasoning of Lawyers 
The time is ripe to return to Hart’s ‘Core/Penumbra’ Thesis, a thesis that was briefly 
touched upon in Chapter 1.  Hart first presented the thesis at the esteemed Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Lecture at Harvard University in 1957.
171
  The lecture is noted as being the primer to the 
now famous Hart/Fuller debate.
172
  Hart further elaborated on the Core/Penumbra Thesis in what 
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Morality of Law via book review: “Lon L. Fuller: The Morality of Law” in HLA Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and 
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is considered one of the most important books ever written on the topic of legal theory, The 
Concept of Law.
173
  Through both of these publications, Hart was able to, amongst other things, 
bring to the forefront of legal theory a novel and persuasive concept known as the 
Core/Penumbra Thesis.  With this context, let’s revisit the thesis. 
 
4.1.1.1 Revisiting the ‘Core/Penumbra’ Thesis 
Hart’s Core/Penumbra Thesis was devised as a response to two separate and, in a sense, 
polar opposite schools of theoretical thought: Legal Realism and Legal Formalism.
174
  On the 
one hand, Legal Realism maintained the notion that legal rules are ultimately indeterminate in 
nature, and that a consequence of this fact was that law itself is an indeterminate enterprise.
175
  
On the other hand, Legal Formalism asserted that law is wholly determinate and, as such, all 
legal disputes could be settled by logical deduction from applicable and determinate legal 
rules.
176
  For Hart, although each theory seemed helpful in parts, neither one was plausible as a 
whole.  He therefore refused to accept either of them on their merits.  In the words of Hart, 
“Formalism and [Realism]… are great exaggerations, salutary where they correct each other, and 
the truth lies between them.”177  Hart set out to find this ‘truth’, with a goal of articulating a more 
reasonable and middle ground approach to an explanation of the nature of law. 
As a setup to the Core/Penumbra Thesis, Hart stressed the undeniable existence of one 
key aspect of human language and, consequently, of legal rules in general.  He stated that words 
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and (since words combine to form legal rules) legal rules are “open textured”178 in nature, 
meaning that they have a level of necessary generality.
179
  In noting this, Hart was forced to 
partially concede to the Legal Realists that the determinacy of legal rules (and the various words 
found therein) is necessarily limited because all legal rules contain some element of 
indeterminacy due to the indeterminacy of words.
180
  Hart labelled such indeterminacy a legal 
rule’s “penumbra of uncertainty”.181  Committing to a penumbra of uncertainty was only a partial 
concession because Hart refused to concede that such uncertainty rendered legal rules wholly 
indeterminate, especially with respect to their application.  In fact, Hart carefully and with 
subtlety pointed out Legal Realism’s mistake of pushing the idea of indeterminacy into excess.182  
Hart asserted that despite the fact that legal rules will intrinsically have a penumbra of 
uncertainty attributable to them, legal rules will nevertheless always contain a “core of settled 
meaning”.183  For Hart, the distinction between the core and the penumbra of a legal rule could 
be explained as follows: 
If we are to communicate with each other at all, and if, as in the 
most elementary form of law, we are to express our intentions that 
a certain type of behaviour be regulated by rules, then the general 
words we use… must have some standard instance in which no 
doubts are felt about its application.  There must be a core of 
settled meaning, but there will be, as well, a penumbra of debatable 
cases in which words are neither obviously applicable nor 
obviously ruled out.  These cases will each have some features in 
common with the standard case; they will lack others or be 
accompanied by features not present in the standard case.
184
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Hart’s point is that although one may not be able to formalistically apply, and therefore 
determine the outcome of, a legal rule in every case due to the fact that there is the possibility of 
indeterminacy that results from a rule’s penumbra of uncertainty, in the majority of cases, a legal 
rule’s core of settled meaning will provide for a logically determinate outcome. 
 Drawing upon a famous example first articulated by Hart helps illuminate the point.
185
  
Suppose that there is a legal rule that states ‘No vehicles shall be allowed in the Park!’.  The 
word ‘vehicle’ in this example is open textured and general, for it could take on a variety of 
different meanings.  Hart emphasized the open textured nature of the word ‘vehicle’ when he 
stated that the word, and consequently the core of settled meaning of the rule, would plainly 
include within its scope “[a]n automobile, but what about bicycles, roller skates, toy 
automobiles?  What about aeroplanes?  Are these, as we say, to be called ‘vehicles’ for the 
purpose of the rule or not?”186  A judge attempting to determine an answer to such questions 
would therefore, according to Hart, be dealing with “problems of the penumbra” and would need 
to use rational discretion (as opposed to pure logical deduction) in order to determine whether or 
not the legal rule ought to incorporate the penumbral case in issue.
187
  With regards to rational 
discretion, Hart was of the view that it could not be logically deductive because “[l]ogic is silent 
on how to classify particulars… and this is the heart of a judicial decision.”188 
 Hart’s example is a general one and, I think, sufficiently establishes the main gist of the 
Core/Penumbra Thesis.  Nevertheless, to help drive the point home, it will be beneficial to 
proffer one more example to assist in contextualizing the point.  Let’s once again return to the 
segregation example discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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 The segregation example is rooted in the concept of (de)segregation in United States 
constitutional jurisprudence.  The main issue in the segregation cases was whether the word 
‘equal’ in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States’ Constitution (also known as the 
Equal Protection Clause) allowed for the notion of segregation.  In one of the first landmark 
decisions of the United States’ Supreme Court dealing with the Equal Protection Clause – the 
decision of Plessy v. Ferguson
189
 – the Court held that the word ‘equal’ indeed allowed for 
segregation, meaning that the government could separate races of people so long as it provided 
the same services to those races in their place of segregation.  The decision resulted in the 
articulation of the infamous (and now overruled)
190
 ‘separate but equal’ doctrine.  This doctrine 
held that so long as the separate public services that are established by the government for each 
race are equal in quality, there would be no violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
191
  The 
underlying reasoning was that the choice to have such services be separate by race was a matter 
of public policy and therefore not necessarily one of law.
192
  As Justice Brown speaking for the 
majority opinion in Plessy stated: 
The object of the [Equal Protection Clause] was undoubtedly to 
enforce equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature 
of things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions 
based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from 
political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms 
unsatisfactory to either.  Laws permitting, and even requiring, their 
separation in places where they are liable to be brought into 
contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the 
other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as 
within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of 
their police power.
193
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Early decisions such as Plessy (and even later decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education
194
) 
demonstrate that the word ‘equal’ in the U.S. Constitution has both a penumbra of uncertainty as 
well as a core of settled meaning.  It is clear from the jurisprudence that ‘equal’ includes equal in 
quality.  It may therefore be assumed that any service that is unequal in quality would be 
unconstitutional.  It follows that the core of settled meaning for the word ‘equal’ would include 
equal in quality.  At the same time, the word equal has a penumbra of uncertainty as well.  In 
Plessy, and later on in Brown, the Court was tasked with determining whether the idea of 
segregation (and desegregation) was included within the penumbra of alternative meanings that 
‘equal’ might encompass.  The uncertainty in these cases clearly lived up to its label, for early on 
in Plessy ‘equal’ did include segregation, while later on in Brown ‘equal’ clearly did not. 
  
4.1.1.2 Refocusing the ‘Core/Penumbra’ Thesis 
As the discussion in the last section typifies, there is a trend (or perhaps better labelled, a 
staple) in legal theory whereby theorists set out to explain the nature of law by focusing on the 
role of judges, the judicial process, and the way by which judges think and reason.
195
  Hart’s 
presentation and explanation of the Core/Penumbra Thesis is no different in this regard.  This, I 
believe, is an unfortunate mistake.  The decision making process with respect to the law involves 
more than just judges and, in fact, its foundation rests upon the reasoning of lawyers.  While it is 
true that at times theorists do discuss the role of lawyers and how lawyers think, they do not tend 
to draw any meaningful distinctions between what lawyers do on the one hand and what judges 
do on the other, including how such a distinction might aid in illuminating a more complete 
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account of the concept of legal reasoning and the nature of law.
196
  Furthermore, while it is true 
that focusing on judges is an important and essential endeavour when explicating a theory of the 
nature of law, to solely do so is to only partially engage with the various concepts.  In 
acknowledging the deficiencies of this history, I turn to refocus Hart’s Core/Penumbra Thesis to 
explain how lawyers think and, more specifically, how lawyers engage in legal reasoning. 
 
4.1.1.2.1 Lawyers and Legal Reasoning 
As alluded to above, because Hart explained the Core/Penumbra Thesis in the context of 
the adjudicative role of judges, he was forced to assert that rational discretion as opposed to 
deductive logic governs penumbral decision making.
197
  Now, while Hart was correct in the 
sense that judges do find themselves facing penumbral type situations, he obscured the notion of 
the Core/Penumbra Thesis by failing to recognize that lawyers indeed use logical and deductive 
penumbral based reasoning.  There is one main difference, however, between how lawyers 
function in penumbral situations as compared to judges: judges are forced to choose amongst 
competing – and much of the time polar opposite – legal arguments existing only within the 
penumbra of a legal rule, while lawyers, plainly, do not have the same type of choice.
198
  
Lawyers are bound by their duty to most effectively represent their clients, and this duty forces 
lawyers to present and advance arguments that best frame their clients’ cases within professional 
                                                 
196
 See e.g. ibid (Dworkin, in fact, seems to use the concept of a lawyer and the concept of a judge, at times, 
interchangeably.  He does so in many of his publications including Law’s Empire.  However, to do so is to ignore 
key distinctions between the two that result from the adversarial nature of our legal systems).  Others have written 
on the concept of legal reasoning as it pertains to lawyers, but not in the sense of how it differs from judges or how it 
affects the nature of law: see e.g. Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal 
Reasoning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
197
 Hart-Positivism supra note 3 at 607-15. 
198
 As will be further explained below, this choice may be one offered by the lawyer or some other logically 
deductive choice; the emphasis being on logically deductive.  The lawyers will define the scope of the issue, while 
the judges, if they so choose, create a logically deductive line of reasoning (i.e. argument) within that delimited 
scope.  Normally, however, if a judge is of the view that an issue has potentially been missed, that judge will 
typically ask that further submissions be made by counsel, thus introducing additional lines of reasoning. 
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and ethical limits.  The lawyer is thus constrained in a different way as compared to judges.  
There may be choice for a lawyer amongst competing lines of argument as to which one is ‘best’ 
for a client in any given situation, but because the direction behind the overall argument never 
changes (i.e. the lawyer must argue based on the best interest of his/her client) the arguments are 
logically deduced therefrom.  This is so regardless of whether the lawyer is dealing with a 
straight forward application of the core of a rule or with a legal rule’s penumbra of uncertainty. 
 In addition, a lawyer’s reasoning does not exist merely within the penumbra of a rule, but 
will interact by moving back and forth between the core and the penumbra.  When engaging in 
legal reasoning, the lawyer may begin at the core of a legal rule and then logically deduce, if 
necessary, an ‘extension’ of the core with hopes that the judge will accept such an extension; or, 
the lawyer may counter a core extension argument by contracting the penumbra of uncertainty 
surrounding a legal rule to the extent necessary to place the penumbral alternatives outside that 
which the judge would consider within his/her discretion.  These two types of reasoning – core 
extension and penumbral contraction – may also be used by lawyers in the reverse order.  
Depending on the needs of a client, the lawyer may begin by attempting to contract the 
penumbra of uncertainty while the opposing lawyer may counter such a contraction argument 
with an argument based on a core extension.  Additionally, both lawyers may develop arguments 
based on competing core extensions.  Again, the type of argument employed will be largely 
dependent on the best interests of that lawyer’s client. 
 Take for example the “No vehicles shall be allowed in the Park!” rule already discussed 
above, with the issue being whether or not a mother’s stroller is to be included within the ambit 
of the rule.  Such a question would be of the penumbral type for a judge, and the judge would 
therefore be tasked with having to choose whether or not the stroller is a vehicle.  From the 
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judge’s perspective, Hart is correct in the sense that there is no way to logically deduce an 
answer to this question.  This is because the judge will inevitably be faced with multiple 
competing lines of logically sound legal argument.  Having said that, from the point of view of 
the lawyer, logical deduction is not only possible, but necessary.  Suppose that Lawyer A is 
arguing in favour of the mother’s position, i.e. that the stroller is not a vehicle and therefore is 
allowed in the park.  Lawyer A will start with a premise (e.g. all vehicles are self-propelled and 
can be licensed) and through deductive reasoning (e.g. the stroller is neither self-propelled nor 
licensable) will reach a logical conclusion (e.g. the stroller is not a vehicle and therefore, 
according to the rule, is not prohibited from being in the park).
199
  Lawyer A in this instance is 
engaging in penumbral contraction as s/he is attempting to limit the penumbral alternatives – the 
potential for indeterminacy – surrounding the word ‘vehicle’ so that it does not extend to include 
the stroller.  If the judge accepts the argument, the core of settled meaning of the legal rule can 
be seen as gaining resistance to future core extensions due to the resulting precedent that the 
judge’s decision will create. 
 Now, suppose on the other hand that Lawyer B is attempting to counter Lawyer A’s 
argument with his/her own logical argument that the stroller is a vehicle and therefore is not 
allowed in the park.  Lawyer B will start with his/her own premise (e.g. all vehicles have wheels 
and can carry passengers) and through deductive reasoning (e.g. the stroller has wheels and 
indeed carries babies as passengers) will reach a separate logical conclusion (e.g. the stroller is a 
vehicle and therefore, according to the rule, is prohibited from being in the park).  This type of 
reasoning (core extension) results in an expansion of the overall ambit of a legal rule (e.g. the 
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 It would be rather silly if I did not note at this point that such an example is overly simplified and that most cases 
can and normally do become much more complex, drawing on and relying on a variety of different particulars and 
authority in order to buttress the overall argument.  That said, for the sake of simplicity and to make the point more 
plain, I will keep the particulars in my example (i.e. self-propulsion, the ability to be licenced, etc.) basic. 
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word ‘vehicle’ now includes within its meaning strollers), which ultimately extends and re-
characterizes the rule’s core of settled meaning. 
 One can apply the same concepts to the segregation example as has been used throughout 
this project.  In Plessy, the lawyer for the state may have begun with the premise that equal 
means affording each individual race the same quality of treatment and not making either race 
inferior to the other, and then argue that because the state is affording each race the same quality 
of treatment separately from one another (this being an exercise in deductive reasoning), the 
Equal Protection Clause is not infringed and the impugned law is therefore constitutional (i.e. a 
logical conclusion is reached).  The state in this example is engaging in a type of penumbral 
contraction, as it is attempting to contract the ambit of the word ‘equal’ through argument 
pertaining to the notion of segregation.  The word ‘equal’, the argument goes, only encompasses 
the idea of equal in quality of services, and not a broader concept such as more substantive 
equality.  The lawyer for the plaintiff, on the other hand, would have engaged in a core 
extension.  That lawyer, for example, may have begun with the premise that the word ‘equal’ 
includes equal access to services despite race, and then argue that because the railroad legislation 
in question segregated individuals based on race (i.e. and exercise in deductive reasoning), the 
Equal Protection Clause is infringed and the impugned law is therefore unconstitutional (i.e. a 
logical conclusion is reached).
200
 
 From the above, the following point is reached: only reasoning that consists of core 
extension or penumbral contraction may be labelled legal reasoning.  Put more generally, legal 
reasoning is reasoning about the rules themselves as opposed to reasoning about facts or about 
                                                 
200
 I again note that other lines of argument (quite likely much more sophisticated and nuanced than the ones I have 
outlined) likely were made.  But it matters not the number or complexity of lines of reasoning.  What matters is that 
each line will be logically deductive, beginning from an anchor (the client’s best interests) and progressing 
therefrom. 
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the straightforward application of facts to settled legal rules.  It is a type of reasoning which is 
relatively unique to lawyers and that lawyers engage in on a regular basis in addition to other 
more ubiquitous types of reasoning.   
This last point, being that lawyers do engage in other types of reasoning besides legal 
reasoning in their day to day practices, should be unpacked a bit more.  To provide some contrast 
to the concept of legal reasoning, I turn now to compare legal reasoning with one other mode of 
more widely used reasoning, which I will refer to as fact-centred reasoning, in order to better 
emphasize the difference between legal and ‘normal’ reasoning.201 
 
4.1.1.2.2 Non Legal Fact-Centred Reasoning 
Lawyers engage in fact-centred reasoning when they argue about whether or not certain 
facts should be accepted as true by the trier of fact.  This type of reasoning occurs almost 
exclusively at the trial level of adjudication for appellate level adjudication is more concerned 
with the implications of legal reasoning.  Drawing on the ‘vehicle’ example above, instead of 
arguing about what is to be included within the scope of the word ‘vehicle’, lawyers might argue 
about whether or not the stroller was actually in the park by using, for example, the testimony of 
witnesses to establish the truth of such facts.  Or, to use the segregation example from Plessy, the 
lawyers might argue about whether or not the plaintiff actually boarded and then refused to leave 
a ‘whites only’ train, and they may again use witnesses to establish such facts.  Lawyers, 
however, are not the only individuals that engage in this type of reasoning.  In truth, fact-centred 
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 There are other modes of non-legal reasoning that lawyers and other individuals engage in and, therefore, the 
discussion that follows is not meant to be exhaustive.  For example, reasoning by analogy is another type of 
reasoning that both lawyers and other members of society engage in on a regular basis.  That said, when reasoning 
by analogy is with respect to a rule, such that it aims to expand the core of the rule or contract the penumbra, it is 
still a form of legal reasoning. 
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reasoning is appropriately viewed as being much more universal in nature as compared to legal 
reasoning. 
A simple family household example should be enough to make the point.  Suppose a 
household consisting of a set of parents and their child has a rule whereby the child must always 
be home by 10:00PM and if the child is not, the child is to be punished.  Suppose further that the 
child attends a meeting with a friend at a restaurant downtown, and that on this occasion there is 
some ambiguity as to exactly when the child returned home, although the ambiguity is narrowed 
to a time between 9:50PM and 10:10PM.  It is clear that the rule in this case, that the child must 
be home by 10:00PM, is settled and thus would not be debated by either the parents or the child.  
Instead, it is the fact of what time the child returned home that is of central importance to the 
dispute, and therefore this fact must be proven in order to properly determine the outcome of the 
case.  If the child is able to prove that s/he returned home, for example, at 9:55PM (perhaps by 
witness testimony, suppose a credible neighbour that witnessed the child arriving home at that 
time), then according to a straightforward application of that fact to the settled rule, the child 
would not be subject to punishment because the child would have returned home by 10:00PM.  
If, however, the parents are able to prove that the child returned home at 10:05PM (perhaps by 
playing back the family surveillance video), then the child would be subject to punishment 
because, again, according to a straightforward application of the fact to the settled rule, the child 
would not have returned home by 10:00PM.  In cases such as this, there is no reasoning about 
the actual rule that governs the situation and therefore no legal reasoning is engaged.  Instead, 
the reasoning focuses on proving the truth of the claimed facts, which engages fact-centred 
reasoning. 
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For the sake of additional clarity, let us consider a slightly altered example.  Suppose now 
that instead of attending a meeting downtown, the child attended a social gathering in a 
neighbouring town.  Suppose further that the child returned to his/her hometown by 9:55PM, and 
subsequently returned to his/her house by 10:05PM, and that there is no dispute regarding any of 
these facts.  Suppose that the parents punish the child for returning to the house after 10:00PM 
and that the child, appalled by such punishment, attempts to argue that s/he was under the belief 
that the word ‘home’ in the rule ‘one must return home by 10:00PM’ is open textured and 
therefore would logically include within its meaning the case of one returning to one’s 
hometown in accordance with certain particulars (e.g. the principle that the rule is meant to keep 
the child safe and that the hometown in question is known to be generally quite safe).  The 
parents would surely dismiss this argument outright, for it would unsettle the core of the rule in 
question and would quite likely be considered an inappropriate ‘twisting’ of the rules of the 
house – although the parents may comment that because the child attempted to make such an 
argument, the child would be best to consider becoming a lawyer.  As has been demonstrated, 
such a comment would be warranted because the type of rule-oriented reasoning that the child 
engaged in is best characterized as legal reasoning. 
 
4.1.1.2.3 Legal Reasoning and the Hard Case Conversion Process 
While the above clarifications regarding the Core/Penumbra Thesis, in the spirit of Hart, 
‘disentangled’ many of the obscurities surrounding the distinction between how lawyers think on 
the one hand and how judges think on the other, more can be said regarding how this distinction 
influences the nature of law.  The majority of this discussion will take place in the sections to 
follow, but to begin, I wish to explain how legal reasoning as discussed above is useful in 
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classifying what constitutes a ‘hard case’,202 in determining whether ‘easy cases’ exist, and in 
identifying a phenomena within the nature of law known as the ‘hard case conversion process’. 
A hard case has traditionally been defined as one where there is no clear answer to the 
legal dispute when considering the applicable law.
203
  In other words, according to this 
definition, hard cases exist when a judge must engage with problems of the penumbra, thereby 
requiring that judge to use discretion in settling the legal issue(s) in dispute.  Conversely, an easy 
case has traditionally been defined as one where the applicable law is clear and the judge’s role 
is simply to apply the facts of the case to that clear legal rule.   
The traditional classifications, however, are not the only way by which easy cases and 
hard cases may be classified.  The existence or nonexistence of the use of legal reasoning by 
lawyers may also be used to classify, and in my view is more helpful in classifying, these types 
of cases.  As has already been seen above, it is clear that there are instances where a legal issue 
can be resolved according to fact-centred reasoning alone.  This will occur when the scope of 
each applicable legal rule in a case is not called into question.  In such cases, once the disputed 
facts are settled, those facts can be applied to the legal rule in a straightforward manner and the 
dispute can be logically and deductively resolved by the judge.  It follows that when lawyers 
engage in only fact centered reasoning – or other types of more ‘normal’ modes of reasoning – 
and not legal reasoning, the case may be classified as an ‘easy one’.  Conversely, if one or both 
of the lawyers in a case engage in legal reasoning, thus calling into question the scope of at least 
                                                 
202
 See e.g. Ronald  Dworkin, “Hard Cases” (1975) 88:6 Harv L Rev 1057 [Dworkin-Hard] (Dworkin discusses the 
intricacies involved with hard cases from an Interpretivist perspective); see also Dworkin-Principle supra note 89 at 
119-45. 
203
 A clear and recent example of a true ‘hard case’ is one of the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act, 2010 SCC 61, [2010] 3 SCR 457.  The judgment contains two main sets of reasons that 
are diametrically opposed to one another. 
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one applicable legal rule, the lawyer(s) will necessarily create a hard case.
204
  Ultimately then, 
when a case is viewed from the perspective of the judge, easy cases only exist when lawyers do 
not engage in legal reasoning. 
Having explained the importance of the (non)existence of legal reasoning to a case’s 
classification as either easy or hard, one might come to notice that lawyers have a sort of natural 
ability to convert easy eases into hard cases simply by engaging in legal reasoning.  This, in fact, 
is true.  The ability, once exercised, necessarily invokes, what may be termed, the hard case 
conversion process.  Like legal reasoning, lawyers will choose to invoke this process when doing 
so is in the best interest of their clients’ cases.  Lawyers are deeply trained in seeking out 
ambiguity in legal rules and then ethically exploiting that ambiguity through legal reasoning in 
order to frame their clients’ cases in the most favourable ways possible.  These skills, in truth, 
encompass much of a law student’s educational experience.  Although judges must deal with the 
resultant penumbral problems, consisting of the binds that I turn next to discuss, it is the lawyers 
that play a central role, much of the time, in creating the overarching penumbral situation. 
 
4.2 Legal Reasoning and the Bind Scenario 
At the beginning of this Chapter, I suggested that legal binds occur due to the fact that a 
legal system is adversarial in nature.  Since each lawyer in an adversarial dispute is to, and 
indeed does, present his/her own competing line(s) of logical argument (or arguments), the result 
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 One may query whether it is the lawyer that is creating the hard case or whether the case is inherently a hard one 
from the nature of the issues.  It must be responded, however, that my argument is ontological in nature, while the 
objection is seemingly epistemological in nature.  Therefore, the objection is misguided for it fails to engage the 
actual argument. 
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is a situation of a ‘legal double bind’,205 or if there are more than two arguments presented, a 
‘legal multiple bind’.  The result is that the adjudication element of law, from the point of view 
of judges, turns out to be all about choice.  Lawyers, through legal reasoning, create competing 
lines of argument.
206
  The role of the judge is to decide which one of the competing lines of 
argument is to be accepted.  In other words, the role of the judge is to choose, with the role being 
indicative of the concept of choice.  This is the nature of adjudication, and thus the nature of a 
law in the 2
nd
-dimension of law. 
 To build upon this idea a little bit more, it will be instructive once more to revisit Hart 
and the Core/Penumbra Thesis.  Hart suggests that legal actors, specifically judges, are at times 
occupied with problems of the penumbra, but are never (and should never be) preoccupied with 
such problems.
207
  Unfortunately, however, this suggestion is somewhat misleading.  On the one 
hand, and as discussed at length above, the Core/Penumbra Thesis necessarily preoccupies 
lawyers – indeed, the very essence of the lawyer (i.e. his/her unique ability to engage legal 
reasoning) is to be preoccupied with the problems of the penumbra.  On the other hand, the 
Core/Penumbra Thesis does not preoccupy judges.  Because a judge’s role is to choose between 
competing lines of legal argument, a judge is not preoccupied with problems of the penumbra at 
all.  In fact, the Core/Penumbra Thesis at times may not even factor into a judge’s decision 
making process.  Lawyers, in essence, act as a penumbral filter, narrowing the judicial choices 
and leaving judges with either a double bind or a multiple bind scenario.  Judges will also 
question lawyers in oral argument in order to further refine the lines of argument and/or to 
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 Cf Radin supra note 103 at 1699-1704.  (As noted in Chapter 1, Radin discusses the concept of a double bind as 
it pertains to feminist theory and oppression.  I have adopted the phrase ‘double bind’ here and have adapted it to the 
legal scenarios faced by judges in an adversarial system of law). 
206
 These ‘lines of argument’ will be defined as first-order considerations to be discussed more fully below. 
207
 Hart-Positivism supra note 3 at 615. 
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eliminate alternative lines of argument that exhibit logical shortcomings.  The nature of what a 
judge must do then, once the competing lines of argument are established, is to basically choose 
one of the various arguments as being superior to the others.  While Hart acknowledges that 
judges do make such choices in limited circumstances (i.e. only penumbral cases), the discussion 
above demonstrates this view to be mistaken.  A judge will have to make such choices in all 
cases which involve lawyers that invoke legal reasoning.  This is because of the resulting either 
legal double bind or legal multiple bind scenario,
208
 or to put it another way, because the 
lawyer(s) chose to invoke the hard case conversion process.   
An objection may be raised at this point.  Why is it the case that only lawyers create 
competing lines of reasoning?  Can a judge not create his/her own argument?  This objection, 
however, is rather simple to overcome.  It is admitted that judges have the ability and power to 
create their own competing lines of argument, but even if a judge chooses to derive and then add 
his/her own competing argument(s) to that of the lawyers’ arguments (again, a path that the 
judge is free to embark on), that judge will only be contributing to the legal multiple bind 
scenario.  The judge’s argument will simply be placed amongst the lawyers arguments with the 
ultimate disposal of the issue still requiring choice amongst the field of choices.
209
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 There are times when a judge may be faced with no competing lines of legal argument.  For example, the legal 
issues might be fully settled, leaving only questions of fact for the judge.  The arguments I make in this project 
assume that the judge is dealing with some sort of ‘hard case’ due to the lawyer(s) invoking the hard case conversion 
process.  For one point of view on hard cases, see Dworkin-Hard supra note 202.  What is important to remember is 
that, ultimately, any time a lawyer engages in legal reasoning, easy cases are converted into hard cases through the 
hard case conversion process. 
209
 A further objection may be made to even this simple answer.  Some may argue that if a judge chooses to create 
his/her own line of argument in any one case, that the judge will always end up choosing that very argument to be 
the ultimate solution.  This skeptical objection, however, is misguided.  Even though a judge may canvass a wide 
variety of different legal solutions, it does not necessarily follow that the judge will always prefer the argument that 
s/he placed amongst the arguments to be canvassed.  A judge that chooses to create his/her own line of argument in 
addition to the solutions proffered by the lawyers is simply being a prudent judge; nothing prohibits a judge from 
being both prudent and pragmatic at the same time. 
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4.2.1 First-Order Considerations 
I have spoken of competing ‘lines of reasoning’ and competing ‘lines of argument’ 
interchangeably above.  It will be useful, however, to provide a general label for this concept and 
to further define the nature of the concept.  I will refer to the concept from now on as first-order 
considerations, for they are the considerations that the judge first considers. 
First-order considerations are the lines of reasoning that lead to double or multiple binds.  
They lead to such binds because each first-order consideration, once compared, is equal in value 
to each other first-order consideration.  The logic comprising any one first-order consideration is 
such that it provides a viable solution to the legal issue in question.  At this level of analysis, it 
matters not which solution is chosen, but only that each solution is of equal value in the sense 
that each provides a solution to the issue. 
For illustrative purposes, consider a comparison between logic and math.  For math, if 
one was to take two different equations that provide a solution to a mathematical problem, it 
would be nonsensical to state that one equation has more value as math as compared to the other.  
It may be the case that one equation is simpler than the other in form, or that one is easier to 
work with, but as far as math goes, they both solve the mathematical problem and are therefore 
of equal value.  Similarly, for a first-order consideration, the logic found therein is a way by 
which the legal problem may be solved and, therefore, the logic as logic is equal in value to the 
logic found in other first-order considerations that are also able to solve the legal problem.   
The above helps explain why the 2
nd
-dimension of law adopts the MRAT of Pragmatism.  
As a refresher, the MRAT holds that in any one legal dispute, there will be multiple right 
answers.  Because all first-order considerations are equal in value, it may be correctly stated that 
any one of them is ‘right’, and/or equivalently that each one is ‘right’.  The ultimate result then is 
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a bind to be dealt with via choice; i.e. the judge will need to choose which first-order 
consideration is best.  But this merely begs the question: how is a judge to determine which first-
order consideration, each being equal in value from the viewpoint of logic, is best?  The answer, 
I suggest, is found in Pragmatism. 
 
4.3 Pragmatic Decision Making 
Because Pragmatism is central to the decision making process, and because the 2
nd
-
dimension of law is to be understood as the time over which a case is adjudicated, it follows the 
2
nd
-dimension of law is properly characterized by Pragmatism.  This section will discuss what is 
meant by Pragmatic decision making.   But before engaging directly with Pragmatism, including 
the idea of second-order considerations, it will be instructive to provide a critique of one of the 
leading views of adjudication explained in Chapter 1, that being Dworkin’s Interpretivism.  
Indeed, in my view Dworkin’s Interpretivism provides a useful contrast to Pragmatic decision 
making.  In being armed with the concept of binds, I hope to show why Dworkin’s view is 
somewhat misguided, and in demonstrating this I hope to clear the way for a fresh and hopefully 
more accurate view of judicial adjudication. 
 
4.3.1 Dworkin and Interpretation 
 Dworkin argues that the identification and application of moral principles is always 
required when legal issues are adjudicated.
210
  It would necessarily follow from this that moral 
principles and morality pervade the 2
nd
-dimension of law.  But such reasoning, unfortunately and 
with great respect, is mistaken.  As I will discuss below, although a version of what one may call 
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 See generally Dworkin-Ambition note 74. (I will refer to this article mostly, though in Chapter 1 I also made 
extensive reference to Dworkin’s seminal work in this regard, Law’s Empire). 
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principle is indeed considered (necessarily) in judicial adjudication, it would be misleading to 
conclude that this somehow characterizes the heart of judicial adjudication as that of 
interpretation.  It must be remembered that the solution to binds is choice, not interpretation.  
While interpretation, in a sense of the idea, is used to create first-order considerations, 
interpretation is not determinative of choice between first-order considerations. 
  Dworkin’s argument that morality pervades adjudication is troublesome for another 
reason.  It posits that judges, in essence, must preoccupy themselves with morality, moral 
principles, and moral reasoning.  Not only is this, in my view, impractical, it is also unnecessary 
and ill-fitting as to what judges actually do.  A judge is not an ethicist, but instead a human 
individual trained in law that is attempting to decide which first-order consideration out of a set 
of first-order considerations is best considering the information available.  A judge therefore 
exists purely to make the best choice amongst legal alternatives, regardless of if that choice is 
moral and/or morally principled.  As was explained in Chapter 1, this is the Best Choice Thesis, 
a thesis fundamental to Pragmatism and pragmatic decision making. 
 
4.3.2 Second-Order Considerations - Principle, Practicality, and Weight 
Second-order considerations are those considerations that assist judges in discriminating 
between first-order considerations.  They are considerations that lend weight to the various first-
order considerations and thus allow for any one choice to not be random in nature.  The two 
second-order considerations that lend weight are what may be called ‘principle’ and 
‘practicality’.  In the end, it is the accepting, rejecting, or balancing of these second-order 
considerations that results in a judge choosing a specific first-order consideration, and with that 
choice being ‘best’. 
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It is important to clarify what I mean by the terms principle and practicality.  I will begin 
with the concept of principle.  Dworkin’s concept of principles involves the cataloguing and 
application of a myriad of different moral considerations, using them as interpretive devices.  In 
contrast, when I speak of principle, I use the term in a more primitive sense.  Principle is the 
immediate emotional (and ‘moral’) response that a judge has to any one first-order 
consideration.
211
  It may be subtle or evident, appropriate or misguided, weak or strong; but in 
any event it will always be present, though not always in the end given effect.  Another feature of 
principle is that it is supplemented by reason; it arrives first, is a posteriori in nature, and is 
supplemented by reason.  Principle, as defined and used in this project, is not an automatic 
justification of first-order considerations, but instead an emotional response in the absence of 
immediate reason, at least at first instance.  It is that ‘this just feels wrong’ or ‘surely this is the 
right thing to do’ etc. response that one experiences after coming to understand a first-order 
consideration.  In addition, it is a characteristic of principle that it has potential to lend weight to 
a first-order consideration and/or against considerations of practicality.   
Practicality, on the other hand, is comprised of the consequences that flow from a first-
order consideration.  As was explained in Chapter 1, the consequences are the effects that will 
occur in the future as a result of any one choice.  So while principle is an emotional response 
supplemented by reason, practicality may be seen as considerations that supplement reason.
212
  
Like principle, practicality also has potential to lend weight for or against a particular first-order 
consideration and/or for or against a particular principle. 
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 Cf Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Toronto, ON: Doubleday Canada, 2011) (Kahneman discusses 
two types of thinking, fast and slow thinking.  My concept of principle somewhat resembles that of fast thinking, a 
type of system our minds utilize.  It “operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of 
voluntary control”). 
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 Cf ibid; see also Posner supra note 103 at 40. 
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The Best Choice Thesis (which can now be defined as a judge’s choice of which first-
order consideration is best in any one legal dispute) is dependent on second-order considerations.  
As mentioned, these second-order considerations lend weight to first-order considerations, with 
the first-order consideration that is given the most weight pursuant to the second-order 
considerations being the one of choice for the judge.  Principle and practicality may work in 
unison, or may work against one another.  For example, it may be the case that the emotional 
response to a first-order consideration is “this is just wrong”, and the practical considerations are 
such that the first-order consideration would create enormous inefficiencies and be unworkable 
in practice.  The result is that the particular first-order consideration would be given very little 
weight and would almost surely be rejected.  On the other hand, it may be the case that the “this 
is just wrong” decision is one that makes good practical sense, or that the practical situation 
flowing from the “this feels right” decision would be inefficient and unworkable.  In such cases, 
the judge would weigh these second-order considerations which in turn would affect the weight 
conferred upon the first-order consideration that resulted in the ‘weight opposed’ second-order 
considerations.  Ultimately, the judge will go through this process for each first-order 
consideration and then choose the first-order consideration that is conferred the most weight.  
This first-order consideration then will be the ‘best choice’ amongst the other first-order 
alternatives. 
It follows from the above that in any one case, the best choice may be one based wholly 
on principle (when practicality is wholly rejected), one based wholly on practicality (when 
principle is wholly rejected), or one based on both practicality and principle (when the two 
align).  Therefore, in any one case, the choice may be moral or practical, or a combination of 
both.  But it is not and cannot be the case that in every case the ultimate decision is one justified 
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by principle.  This is because principle is but one second-order consideration and it may be 
rejected for that of practicality, another second-order consideration.  
 
4.3.2.1 Precedent – A Unique Consideration 
The discussion thus far has not directly engaged with an important aspect of law, that 
being precedent.  A complete discussion of precedent, however, would be tangential and 
therefore I do not intend to explain its various intricacies here.
213
  Instead, it will suffice to 
develop a few arguments with respect to how precedent affects judicial adjudication and how 
precedent is both a first-order consideration and a second-order consideration. 
By precedent I mean the rules that are prima facie binding on judges or persuasive to 
judges.  Such precedent is unique in the sense that it may be both a first-order consideration 
and/or a second-order consideration.  On the one hand, the logic within the precedent, assuming 
it is not fallacious, is an established first-order consideration.  As such, it will be included 
amongst the other first-order considerations for the purposes of adjudication.  On the other hand, 
precedent is also a second-order consideration because it provides weight to applicable first-
order considerations.  The strength of the weight will be dependent upon the level of court the 
precedent originates from, with the strength comprising a spectrum from weak to near absolute.  
But this is not the only weight the precedent will have.  There will also be second-order 
considerations of principle and practicality with respect to that precedent in the context of the 
legal issues currently before a judge.  If either the principle or the practicalities inherent in the 
precedent lead to an unpalatable result for the current case, the precedent will be distinguished on 
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the facts or, if the appellate court has the power to so do, will be overruled.  Similarly, if the 
principle and practicalities lead to a palatable result, the precedent will add additional weight to 
the applicable first-order consideration(s). 
One other aspect of precedent should be discussed.  This aspect draws on Raz’s concept 
of pre-emptive reasons as outlined in Chapter 1.
214
  The special institutional nature of precedent 
is such that it both post-empts and pre-empts second-order considerations.  More specifically, the 
nature of precedent is such that it post-empts principle and pre-empts practicality.  Precedent acts 
to limit these second-order considerations and is thus somewhat scope defining.  That said, the 
ability of precedent to maintain its status as such is directly proportionate to a judge’s own 
second-order considerations with respect to that precedent.  Therefore, if the second-order 
considerations weigh in favour of distinguishing the precedent, the precedent will be 
distinguished and it will lose its pre-emptive and post-emptive status.  Or, if the second-order 
considerations weigh in favour of reinforcing a first-order consideration, then the precedent will 
lend additional weight to that first-order consideration in a pre-emptive and/or post-emptive 
fashion, thus eliminating certain other first-order considerations and, potentially, the underlying 
bind. 
 
4.3.1 Planning and Judicial Adjudication 
A small semi-digression is in order before this chapter concludes.  As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, Shapiro, based on his own in-depth research, concludes that human beings are 
planning creatures.
215
  As such, one might argue that since judges are human beings and since 
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human beings are planning creatures, that judges must therefore create plans in the form of 
jurisprudential laws that result from their adjudicative processes.  I think this argument, however, 
is somewhat misleading.  A judge as a planning creature does ‘plan’, but the planning is quite 
limited.
216
  Judges, in a sense, plan to dispose of the legal issues before them, but this is also 
more of a duty.  The only plan that may be seen is that of gathering the applicable first-order 
considerations and applying the second-order considerations such as to bring about reason for 
choice.  Therefore, the ultimate plan is to choose and the business of the judge is that of choice.  
It is not the business of the judge to develop complex plans that may be needed to support and/or 
advance a society.  Indeed, judges may hear submissions that ring of good public policy, but 
engaging public policy, as understood by judges, is something best left to the legislature.  A 
competent judge will always be mindful of the consequences that follow from any one choice 
and then take those consequences into consideration; indeed, this has already been identified as 
the second-order consideration of practicality.  But to then say that the judge is engaging in 
complex planning would be misleading and ultimately mistaken.  Again, a judge chooses and re-
chooses over time.  A judge’s duty is to dispose of the legal issues in the case that is before 
him/her at that specific time.  Therefore, the judge, as a human being (i.e. planning creature) 
must plan to dispose of the case.  The tool by which s/he does so is Pragmatism, understood as 
the interplay between first-order considerations and second-order considerations.  While it is true 
that the results of these choices might, over time, resemble a plan, they are not a result of 
planning for that resulting plan per se.  If a judge were to engage in such planning, that judge 
would be engaging in complicated public policy, which again is not the business of the judge.  
Such complicated public policy decisions are the business of the elected officials of a society.  In 
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any event, the discussions in this chapter show that the nature of adjudication is such that this 
type of planning cannot and does not occur, and any notion of judges engaging in public policy 
through planning is thus mistaken. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The arguments in this chapter resulted in a rejection of Dworkin’s model of adjudication, 
that of Interpretation, and an embrace of Pragmatism, for Pragmatism better models that which 
judges actually do.  An implication of this was that any one decision need not be moral.  One 
may thus find it necessary to argue that since the individual changes in the law need not be 
moral, that law as a concept must be separated from morality.  This argument misses an 
important point, one I should expand upon now as prelude to Chapter 5.  While it is true that any 
one legal decision need not be grounded in moral principle, or considered moral in result, it does 
not necessarily follow that, over time, such decisions will wholly separate law from morality.  
Legal decisions need not always be moral in how they were decided, or in their ultimate result, in 
order for law to have a necessary connection to morality.  This is because of the answer to the 
Primary Question, namely that law is the constant and consistent pursuit of what law ought to be, 
with the individual pursuits (i.e. the individual adjudications) being Pragmatic.  Pragmatism 
requires the re-deciding of issues at future times; therefore, because the 2
nd
-dimension of law is 
characterized by Pragmatism, the 2
nd
-dimension recognizes that revisitation of previously 
decided legal issues will occur at future times.  Eventually, various circumstances (legal, 
societal, political, economic, etc.) that may come to factor into a judge’s second-order 
considerations may change so that the outcome of a later case more closely mirrors morality as 
compared to a previous case that decided the same or a similar legal issue.   
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Let’s briefly revisit the segregation example one more time to prove the point.  In Plessy, 
the justices at that time were faced with multiple first-order considerations and had to decide 
amongst these.  In the end, the majority chose segregation even though this decision is generally 
not considered to be moral.  In fact, the judges were likely of the view that the practicalities of 
segregation outweighed the principle that weighed in favour of more substantive equality, or at 
the time, the practicalities and principle coalesced such that the first-order consideration of 
segregation had the most weight after second-order considerations had taken place.  A pragmatic 
decision was reached, and the doctrine of separate but equal was born (a doctrine that was 
eventually found to be lacking, especially in principle in later years).  This is part of the nature of 
judicial decision making, it is a product of its times.  But Pragmatism also calls for the 
revisitation of the legal issues over time.  As such, in 1954, nearly 60 years after Plessy was 
decided, the United States Supreme Court decided to revisit the issue of segregation and equality 
in Brown.  This time, a unanimous Court ended up overruling Plessy by choosing a first-order 
consideration pursuant to second-order considerations that had principle outweigh the 
practicalities.  The example shows that revisitation is key. 
The ultimate point is this: while the 2
nd
-dimension of law only concerns itself with one 
case at a time, one will notice that over all of time, law writ large is a culmination of the ‘best’ 
pragmatic legal decisions.  As time progresses then, the law seemingly works towards remedying 
its deficiencies.  Put another way, and as I will cover more fully in the next chapter, law works 
towards working itself pure.  This is law’s purification process.  Law seemingly pursues 
perfection as it looks to move towards a better state of the law overall.  In this way then, law can 
be seen as the constant and consistent pursuit of what law ought to be.  And, it is this perpetual 
purification process (the constant and consistent pursuit of a better state of the law) that is moral 
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in and of itself.  It necessarily connects law to morality (the other half of the Paradox).  But in 
saying this, it must be remembered that the 2
nd
-dimension of law is only concerned with a single 
case of adjudication and not a string of such cases; therefore, the purification process and the 
constant and consistent pursuit is beyond the scope of the 2
nd
-dimension of law.  One must 
therefore move on to a new dimension, the final dimension known as the 3
rd
-dimension of law, in 
order to more fully understand the nature of that process.    
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Chapter 5: The 3rd-Dimension of Law – From the Beginning of Law to the 
Ever Changing Present Day 
 
 
Fig 3   
 The 3
rd
-dimension of law is to be conceptualized as law as it exists from the very first 
point in legal time to the ever changing present day.  I intend to argue that this dimension cannot 
be divorced from morality and that the vantage point of this dimension allows one to see that law 
is the constant and consistent pursuit of what law ought to be.  It will thus follow that the 
Naturalist NCT holds true in this dimension.  After beginning this chapter with a brief 
introduction to what the 3
rd
-dimension entails, I will further develop the dimension by addressing 
three fundamental concepts.  Firstly, I will discuss what I mean by the law having a true 
110 
 
ambition for itself by working towards working itself pure.  I will then discuss Fuller’s morality 
of aspiration.  And, finally, I will turn to discuss what shall be labelled the General Goal of legal 
systems.  These discussions will be susceptible to various objections and, therefore, at the end of 
this chapter I will devote some time to addressing two of the more formidable objections. 
 
5.1 What is the 3rd-Dimension of Law? 
The 3
rd
-dimension of law is, in essence, a diachronic view of law.  It is the complete 
picture of law that is a step removed from the details of both the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 dimensions – it 
operates at a higher level of abstraction – and spans from what one can imagine as the beginning 
of law (or legal time) to the ever changing present day.  It encompasses all of what may be called 
legal time.  Recognition of a ‘step back’ is important, because it changes the data that is 
accessible to the individual, that is accessible from the vantage point of the 3
rd
-dimension.  In 
other words, because one places oneself at a higher level of abstraction, the entire spectrum of 
law over time becomes available for viewing and the specific details of the other two dimensions 
become unavailable.  It is from this higher level of abstraction, i.e. the 3
rd
-dimension of law, that 
one is able to observe that law, over time, works towards working itself pure, or in other words, 
works towards ‘perfection’ and that therefore law is the constant and consistent pursuit of what 
law ought to be.  This will become known as law’s true ambition for itself. 
 
5.2 Understanding Law’s True Ambition for Itself 
The 3
rd
-dimension of law has a theme: law has an ambition for itself, that ambition being 
to work towards working itself pure, with pure meaning wholly moral (or just).  The idea that the 
law works itself pure is attributable to Lord Mansfield and his argument with respect to the 
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common law in Omychund v. Barker.
217
  Lord Mansfield argued that “[A] statute very seldom 
can take in all cases, therefore the common law, that works itself pure by rules drawn from the 
fountain of justice, is for this reason superior to an act of parliament.”218  Now, although the idea 
of the common law being superior to statute has been completely rejected, the notion that the law 
works itself pure has redeemable merit.  To harvest this merit, I will use the term not in the sense 
Lord Mansfield used it, but instead in relation to the 3
rd
-dimension of law. 
Closer to my usage of this age old concept, is that explained by Dworkin.  He called the 
idea ‘law’s ambition for itself’.219  In Law’s Empire, Dworkin stated the following: 
Sentimental lawyers cherish an old trope: they say that law works 
itself pure.  The figure imagines two forms or stages of the same 
system of law, the nobler form latent in the less noble, the impure, 
the present law gradually transforming itself into its own purer 
ambition, haltingly, to be sure, with slides as well as gains, never 
worked finally pure, but better in each generation than the last.  
There is matter in this mysterious image, and it adds to both the 
complexity and the power of law… .220 
 
The notion builds upon the words of Lord Mansfield’s, being that the law works towards purity.  
That said, it would be misleading of me if I did not point out that Dworkin himself was not a 
sentimental lawyer that cherished this old trope, but instead appeared to reject the idea that law 
can be made more pure.
221
  Dworkin advanced an argument that the law as it stands is always in 
its most pure form if one accepts his notion of law as integrity, i.e. the Interpretive Thesis.  As 
Chapter 4 demonstrated, however, this thesis is to be rejected, and thus I need not deal with this 
type of skepticism anymore here.
222
  Instead, one might ask whether one should accept 
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Dworkin’s characterization of the classic phrase.  I suggest one should, but only after a subtle 
change to the phrase is implemented, one that adds some emphasis.  My claim, and the claim that 
I will defend throughout this chapter through an analysis of the 3
rd
-dimension of law, is that the 
law cannot work itself to the end of ultimate purity, or like Dworkin nicely summarized, the law 
can never work itself ‘finally pure’.  Therefore, my version of the claim takes the following 
form: law works towards working itself pure, with the emphasis here on the inability of the law 
to reach complete purity.  The claim that law works towards working itself pure is what I shall 
call law’s true ambition for itself.  I acknowledge and highlight that the clarification is mainly a 
semantic one at this point as opposed to a substantive change in the classic concept itself, but it is 
a change that nevertheless helps to better frame the concept and clear it of some needless 
mystification. 
 Unfortunately, clarifying the semantic issue does not go far enough in explaining the 
claim itself.  In fact, the claim raises many initial objections and additional questions that require 
attention and analysis.  These questions are numerous and by no means easy to dismiss.  What 
                                                                                                                                                             
Hercules is “[a]n imaginary judge of superhuman intellectual power and patience…” – ibid at 239.  Admittedly, with 
such a judge on staff in the courtroom of a nation, one could only assume that Dworkin’s claim (i.e. that the law as it 
stands will always be in its purest form) would likely hold.  After all, who am I as a mere mortal to even consider 
myself worthy of jostling with superhuman intellectual power and patience?  Unfortunately for the claim however, 
no such judge exists in modern day society.  Dworkin’s claim is an ideal – it denotes a state of the law that is 
ultimately unattainable in real life.  Therefore, in advancing a theory of law (including a theory of adjudication), I 
suggest we would be better served to adopt the more realistic notions of human fallibility and limitability as our 
foundation and then build upon the theory from there.  I did just this in Chapter 4.  The notions together hold that 
human beings are limited in capacity and fallible in both character and action and, as such, in considering a realistic 
ideal, humans will only be able to do their best in the situations that come before them.  Humans will make 
mistakes, humans will err, and humans will be limited (in a variety of ways) in their ability to develop solutions to 
problem at any one specific point in time, both legal and otherwise.  Therefore, the best humans can do as agents of 
the law is constantly and consistently pursue a better system of law.  In other words, the best humans can do is work 
towards working the law pure through society’s legal institutions.  As humans do exactly this, the result is a system 
of law that seemingly works towards working itself pure, and as we have seen, this parallels the classic purity 
concept and can be rightfully labelled law’s true ambition for itself.  Now, I note that Dworkin has responded to 
similar objections by stating that the myth aspect of Judge Hercules matters not, for it is the use of Judge Hercules as 
a theoretical tool that elucidates “[t]he hidden structure” of adjudication.  But again, and as Chapter 4 makes clear, 
this hidden structure is a false one and its falsity is ultimately perpetuated and exaggerated by the theoretical tool of 
choice. 
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does it mean for the law or a law to be pure?  How is law to become pure?  Can the law even be 
pure at all?  What about evil or ‘wicked’ systems of law?  Do such nefarious enterprises not 
undermine the very idea of purity in the law and/or a purification process within the law itself?  
Still others may object by arguing that to say the law works towards working itself pure is to 
commit to one end or to one conception of purity, but with numerous and incommensurable 
systems of law existing in the world, would such a committal not be illogical?  Or to put it 
another way, is not the very notion of purity and purification incoherent from the outset of the 
argument?  Put even more simply, is there only one conception of purity?  Such questions and 
objections are important and I will be careful not to trivialize or dismiss them without proper 
analysis.  As such, I shall devote this entire chapter to disentangling these issues.  Through the 
clarifications, this chapter is aimed at substantiating both the claim that law works towards 
working itself pure, and the additional claim (also known as the solution to the Primary Question 
‘what is law’) that law is the constant and consistent pursuit of what law ought to be. 
  
5.3 Purity and the General Goal of Legal Systems 
Thus far it has been posited that law works towards working itself pure.  What needs to 
be addressed then is what is meant by pure.  A purified law is a law that is as it ought to be.  It is 
a morally perfected law; a law that is what it ought to be in the moral sense.  Therefore, a pure 
law is a law that is wholly moral and one that can be properly understood as ideal or existing in 
its ideal state.  It is one that all reasonable persons would agree is as it ought to be, one that no 
legitimate claims of change to it can be made and, therefore, one that reasonable persons do not 
wish to change.  As such, the point of purity exists when what ‘is’ coincides with what ‘ought to 
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be’.  This reasoning underlies the solution to the Secondary Question that was outlined in the 
introduction to this project. 
There may be different levels of perfection however and, therefore, different levels of 
purity within any one system of law and even within any one specific law.  For example, few 
(anarchists notwithstanding) would argue that society is better off without a system of criminal 
laws.  This is because having a system of criminal laws is for the overall moral good of any one 
society.  Therefore, the idea of criminal laws, regardless of arguments for or against any specific 
criminal law, is wholly moral and, as a result, pure.  Similarly, few would argue that there should 
not be any laws that prohibit rape.  It matters not whether individuals disagree about what 
constitutes rape, it only matters that: 1) there is general agreement that there ought to be laws 
prohibiting rape;
223
 and 2) there indeed exist laws that prohibit rape in some way.  But having 
general perfection/purity does not lead to overall perfection/purity.  Within each of these systems 
and others, individuals will disagree about which laws and which set of laws are for the moral 
good.  These individuals will then move and act to change laws when they are deficient in whole 
or in part.
224
 
 Since individuals make attempts to change laws such that they may become more pure, 
i.e. they work towards working the law pure, it is implied, necessarily, that these individuals are 
                                                 
223
 See Shapiro-Legality supra note 13 at 204-12 (Shapiro discusses a version of shared agreement with respect to 
Planning Thesis that he calls the Shared Agency Thesis.  The latter holds that legal activity is a shared activity.  
Shapiro goes on to argue that every system has a master plan that is “[a] function of the substantive goals that 
designers intend to advance”, that being a product of shared agency). 
224
 See ibid at 213-24 (In this section of Legality, Shapiro introduces his Moral Aim Thesis which holds that “The 
fundamental aim of legal activity is to remedy the moral deficiencies of the circumstances of legality.” [emphasis 
added].  Now, Shapiro claims that the aim of the law is to rectify moral deficiencies such that when communities 
face complex moral problems, planning is invoked and laws are implemented in furtherance of these plans.  My 
claim is somewhat different.  My claim is that individuals aim to remedy deficiencies in the laws themselves (i.e. in 
the plans).  Whether or not the aim of all laws is to remedy moral problems in society is beyond the scope of this 
project and I take no stance either way.  What I will say is that this latter claim is advanced by Shapiro and his 
defence of it is considerable). 
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working towards some general goal.  To reason otherwise would be to suggest that individuals 
are implementing changes at random and therefore not working towards anything at all.  Such, 
however, would be nonsensical since these individuals are implementing change for the reason 
of bringing about higher levels of purity.  It follows that there must be some general goal for any 
system of law, a general goal that individuals seek to attain.  From the vantage point of a higher 
level of abstraction, this goal may be seen as the pursuit of an ideal state of law and, as this goal 
is general to all legal systems, it may be labeled the General Goal.  The goal is general and also, 
in a sense, common for it is shared amongst legal systems and provides the underlying reason for 
action with respect to the law for the individuals within those systems.
225
 
 The above discussion helps demonstrate the solution to the Primary Question, being that 
law is the constant and consistent pursuit of what law ought to be.  In a legal system where 
individuals are constantly and consistently working to develop better laws and/or remedy 
deficiencies within existing laws, and where the judiciary is constantly and consistently choosing 
the best alternatives in disputes with respect to the law, the law naturally and incrementally 
works towards its pure and ideal state or, in other words, towards the General Goal.  While at 
any one point in time the law may be closer to or further away from the General Goal, in relative 
terms, due to human fallibility and limitability, it is the ambition towards perfection that causes 
morality to pervade the law.  This pervasiveness will be referred to later on as the ‘audacity of 
morality’ and helps explain why the law, when viewed writ large (i.e. through the 3rd-dimension 
of law) accords with the NCT and thus Naturalism. 
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5.3.1 Fuller and the Morality of Aspiration 
An interesting type of objection to the preceding discussion is, somewhat ironically, 
found in a work of the Naturalist Lon Fuller.  In The Morality of Law, Fuller discusses two types 
of morality: the morality of duty and the morality of aspiration.
226
  On the one hand, the morality 
of duty is more micro-focused, being a bottom-up concept that identifies what individuals must 
do at a basic level in order for there to be a functioning society.
227
  The morality of aspiration, on 
the other hand, is macro-focused in nature, setting out a path towards an ultimate end.  The 3
rd
-
dimension of law is also macro-focused, taking into account all the various points in time 
throughout all of law.  Therefore, my focus will be on the morality of aspiration, for its macro-
focused view accords with that of the 3
rd
-dimension. 
Fuller discusses ‘The Aspiration towards Perfection in Legality’ and argues that a perfect 
system of law (i.e. one where his eight principles of legality are perfectly realized) “[i]s not 
actually a useful target for guiding the impulse towards legality.”228  He argues this is because 
the goal of perfection is much too complex to guide behaviour.
229
  With respect, I disagree.  
Fuller’s view of the morality of aspiration is only half correct.  On the one hand, it is true that we 
as human beings or as a society have aspirations, and that we may even have aspirations to reach 
some level of perfection or to be brought closer to perfection.  On the other hand, and where 
Fuller seems to me to be misguided for he seems to miss (or reject) the implications of practical 
reason, is in his conclusion that despite these aspirations, they cannot successfully guide one’s 
conduct towards the conception of perfection due to complexity.  It must be remembered that 
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much of the complexity that might exist in other dimensions is dulled by the generalization of the 
end aspiration made possible through the vantage point of the 3
rd
-dimension of law.  It follows 
from this generalized aspiration that guidance is not only possible, but inevitable.  This is 
because the generalized end aspiration, or the ultimate goal of perfection (i.e. the General Goal), 
provides reason for action.
230
  These reasons, in turn, guide and influence one to act towards the 
pursuit of that goal, for those reasons act as a catalyst for the taking of actions that move one 
closer to that goal.  It follows then that if a legal system was to have an ultimate goal (something 
now understood as true and being the General Goal), and if the agents of that system shared that 
goal (something again known to be true, for the General Goal is common to all legal systems) 
then that ultimate goal would likewise act as a reason for action for those individuals in the 
system.  The General Goal then guides and influences the actions of the agents of a system in 
their pursuit of that General Goal. 
 
5.4 The Audacity of Morality: Why Law in the 3rd-Dimension of Law is Natural 
Through the 3
rd
-dimension of law, or in other words when the law is viewed writ large, 
law is the constant and consistent pursuit of what law ought to be.  The 2
nd
-dimension of law 
consists of judges making the best choice possible in each individual case.  The aggregate of 
these ‘best’ decisions, viewed from a higher level of abstraction, is an inevitable intertwining of 
law and morality due to law’s ambition of constantly and consistently moving towards its ideal 
state.  It is morally right for a judge to do his/her best in making decisions, and also in making 
the best decisions in the circumstances of any one case, even if the result of that case is immoral.  
This point, I think, is reasonably uncontroversial.  The more controversial issue is how one may 
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claim that morality pervades the law when at any one point in time laws may exist as immoral 
(take, as an example, the segregation case of Plessy discussed in prior chapters).  This issue, 
however, only arises when one fails to understand law’s dimensional nature.  While a system of 
law may never be what it perfectly ought to be, this actuality does not change the fact that law 
will always have a necessary connection to morality in the 3
rd
-dimension of law; this is the 
audacity of morality and why the law, when viewed writ large, conforms to the NCT.  
Regardless of imperfections at any one point in time (remembering that these imperfections are 
only viewable from the vantage point of the 1
st
-dimension of law), and regardless of an inability 
to achieve absolute perfection, the law constantly and consistently moves towards perfection, and 
it is this movement and progression towards perfection that is moral in and of itself.  The 
purification process is moral, and the 3
rd
-dimension provides one with the vantage point from 
which one may view that process.  Ultimately then, because of the moral nature of the 
purification process, and the fact that the process is intrinsic to the 3
rd
-dimension of law, this 
dimension is inextricably linked to morality.  This is the nature of law in the 3
rd
-dimension. 
 
5.5 Objections to the 3rd-Dimension of Law and Law’s True Ambition for Itself 
By this point, some may have developed certain objections to the notion that law has a 
true ambition for itself, and it will thus likely prove helpful to engage with some of the more 
formidable objections.  The first is the problem of incommensurability or more specifically the 
notion of incommensurable legal systems.  The second is the issue of ‘wicked’ systems of law.   I 
will tackle each in turn.  
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5.5.1 The Objection of Incommensurable Legal Systems 
Let’s first address the issue of incommensurable legal systems.  One may ask how the 
claim that law works towards working itself pure is tenable when there are a great variety of 
legal systems in the world that differ greatly in both form and substance.  Such systems are 
sometimes said to be incommensurate or lacking a basis for comparison of value.
231
  Admittedly, 
this objection appears at first glance to be rather difficult to overcome as empirical evidence 
seems to suggest that many of the legal systems in the world are so different that they are to be 
rendered incommensurable.  Having said that, a sound reply to the objection is possible to 
develop, but in order to support the reply, I will need to revisit the work of Scott Shapiro and his 
book Legality.
232
  In Legality, Shapiro argued for a theory of law as plans, and as was outlined in 
Chapter 1, his argument was based upon a deep foundation of philosophical and psychological 
research, with this research indicating the human beings are planning creatures by nature.
233
 
 
5.5.1.1 Human Beings as Planning Creatures – A Clarification 
Shapiro, in referencing philosopher Michael Bratman, states that, “human beings have a 
special kind of psychology: we not only have desires to achieve complex goals, but we also have 
the capacity to settle on such goals and to organize our behavior over time and between persons 
to attain them.”234  Shapiro’s point is that human beings not only have the ability to plan and 
make plans, but that they have an inherent drive to plan, make plans, and adopt the same. This 
has important implications with respect to morality and the law, but before I go on to explain 
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them, I feel it necessary to first qualify the concept slightly.  It is important to keep in mind the 
degree by which individuals engage in planning behaviour.  Planning occurs on a spectrum, 
beginning with a very limited ability or even inability to plan due to one’s current circumstances, 
ranging to the ability to make multifaceted and diverse plans such as exist in more complex 
societies.  Generally then, human beings are planning creatures to the extent they are free and 
able to plan.  If stresses are placed upon humans to the point that they are only able to react, 
hence becoming reactionary creatures rather than planning creatures, then planning and one’s 
abilities to plan will cease.  For example, planning will cease in immediate emergency situations 
such as when one begins to slip on ice in one’s car, or upon being almost to the point of complete 
dehydration and then stumbling upon water.  In such circumstances, human beings revert to 
innate instinctual action as opposed to complex or even basic planning actions.  Therefore, it is 
clearer to state that human beings are planning creatures if and only if they are free and able to 
engage in planning. 
 
5.5.1.1 Confronting the Objection 
With the clarification in mind, it follows that human beings that engage in more 
reactionary actions due to their circumstances will not plan to the extent of human beings whose 
circumstances are such that they are free and able to make plans.  The former will rely more 
heavily on instincts as they may not be amongst an environment that wishes to foster more 
complex plans, while the latter will engage planning on a regular basis.  So the degree by which 
humans plan, and the corresponding complexity of those plans, directly relates to the 
circumstances by which planning may evolve out of.  What is important is that it is only at the 
point of planning that a legal system or a system of law can such be defined as one. 
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Now, as Shapiro’s Planning Thesis demonstrates, when planning is engaged, legal 
systems begin, and also develop to the extent of the planning.  These systems may then be 
compared in a variety of different ways based on those plans, the most notable for this project’s 
purposes would be by evaluating the successfulness of the plans in attaining the General Goal.  
The General Goal, as was mentioned, remains the same for all legal systems.  Therefore, even 
though the plans for each individual legal system may be incommensurate in the sense that their 
value has no basis for comparison with respect to other legal systems, at a more abstract level the 
systems indeed have a basis for comparison in the way by which, and the degree by which, those 
plans adhere to and attain the General Goal.  It is in this way that one can say that one system of 
law is more just or less just than another; and in being able to compare value in this way, it 
follows that the objection of incommensurability, understood as a lack of comparability with 
respect to value, must fail.  
 
5.5.2 The Objection of Wicked Legal Systems 
The second objection is an important one and takes the following form: is it not true that 
human beings have the capacity for evil, and if so, can human beings not create evil systems of 
law?  Would these systems then not be the opposite of purity?  And since human beings are 
planning creatures, can they not also plan for evil and/or create evil plans?  Putting this 
altogether, is it not the case that simply because human beings are planning creatures by nature, 
that this fact cannot logically mean that human beings plan for the good by nature?  Put another 
way, how can law work towards working itself pure, with a wholly pure system of law being one 
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that is wholly moral, when there have clearly been instances of evil or wicked systems
235
 that 
were intrinsically immoral and the result of evil and wicked plans?  These systems, after all, 
appear to manifest in a form that is anything but pure as I have argued pure to mean.  Wicked 
systems are clearly evil and have potential to plunge deeper and deeper into evil, thus shocking 
our consciences.  In fact, they may even be considered the exact antithesis of morality. 
Although this objection, in its various forms, and upon first glance appears logically 
coherent and perhaps devastating to the 3
rd
-dimension of law, it is nevertheless misleading.  
There are multiple reasons for this, some internal to the wicked system and others more external.  
The internal tend to stem from the theory of law as plans, with the external tending to stem from 
the notion of hindsight.  To help explain the responses, I will invoke a hypothetical example of a 
wicked legal system, using it as an analytical and comparative tool.  But, before I go on to do so, 
I must stress that I do so delicately and with empathetic caution.  I preface that which is about to 
be said with the following: it is beyond reasonable dispute that the actions and consequences of 
any one wicked legal system are in any way moral.  In fact, these systems may only be seen as 
cruel and heinous, the likes of which have left deep scars on the face of humanity forever.  As 
such, the responses to the objection of wicked legal systems that follow are in no way meant to 
be an attempt to justify the actions of such legal systems.  It is simply a philosophical description 
of the realities of, and implications brought about by, wicked legal systems. 
So, with the above caution always in mind, imagine a system of law where the 
individuals under that system are comprised of three distinct races.  Suppose the system has laws 
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Wicked Legal Systems: Pathologies of Legality, 2nd ed, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
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that require the complete separation of each of the three races from each of the others, and that 
any co-mingling outside of government is to be punished by a period of extended torture 
followed by execution.  Suppose further that two of the races join together to pass laws to the 
severe disadvantage of the third for the reason that doing so is for the overall good of the society; 
the consequence of such laws being that drastically inferior services are provided to that third 
race of people and that the third race is significantly marginalized.  Clearly, such a system is 
monstrously wicked.  That said, the heinous reasoning does not remove the underlying belief by 
the individuals in power that what they are doing is for the overall good of the society.  In a 
perverted and twisted way, these individuals are working towards making a system of law that 
they believe is wholly just.  Now, other individuals belonging to alternative legal systems may 
clearly (and rightly) disagree with this wicked system, criticize it, and learn from it, and this fits 
with an understanding of how the law works towards working itself pure, and with an 
understanding of how the law constantly and consistently pursues what it ought to be.  These 
individuals may view the atrocities occurring within the wicked system and provide reasons as to 
why it is wicked and not in accordance with the General Goal of all legal systems.  As a result, 
the individuals may influence their own legal systems to implement appropriate safeguards in 
order to protect their societies from falling victim to such atrocities.  The individuals, as planning 
creatures, may use reasoned hindsight to progressively and persistently advance their systems of 
law into one that is more moral, i.e. more in line with the General Goal.  This, ultimately, can be 
seen as a manifestation of law’s true ambition for itself for it shows how the law goes about 
working towards working itself pure in a truly moral sense.  In addition, the third race in that 
wicked system might provide criticism of the laws, arguing that they ought to be changed.  It 
may be the case that upon increasing pressure from this race, and/or from other legal systems, the 
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political scheme may change such that the law as it is becomes changed to that which it ought to 
be.  It may even result in the collapse of the wicked system altogether.  Either way, the audacity 
of morality is still present as a result of the purification process going about its business. 
The point is that reasoned individuals and planning creatures, i.e. human beings, will 
move themselves away from evil/wicked systems of law and the hardships and atrocities that are 
derived therefrom, or find ways to bring about change within that wicked system to extents 
possible.  Generally, human beings will make attempts to learn from their mistakes and 
shortcomings and plan to create a better route forward.  If the opposite were true, then human 
beings would be doomed to make the same mistakes over and over again, never correcting them, 
and our societies would never advance.  Such an argument suggests that human beings do not 
find reasons for change, or if they do, cannot act on those reasons.  Extrapolated from this 
argument would be perpetual, needless, and mass human suffering, without possibility of 
correction.  However, and again, it is not general human nature (though it may be the nature of 
some humans) to wish and implement random suffering and hardship upon fellow humans, or to 
be wholly selfish such that indulgence in one’s own pursuits would leave one blind to even 
minor consideration of others.  Planning creatures through the direction of the General Goal, plan 
to achieve the good, plan to embolden morality, and plan to increase the state of morality within 
a society and a system of laws.  When a plan fails, reasoned creatures learn from such failures 
and develop more sophisticated and morally supported plans as a result. 
Ultimately then, as far as the 3
rd
-dimension of law is concerned, it does not matter 
whether a system of law at any one time is wicked because the planning nature of human beings 
is itself good.  This good might manifest, again at times, as pure evil, but eventually reasoned 
creatures will look back upon such plans, or the plans of other reasoned creatures, and make 
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attempts to remedy the shortcomings, thereby removing the evil in such plans.  In the same way, 
individuals within a legal system will look back upon the consequences of their laws or the laws 
of others and then argue for remedies to the deficiencies within the laws.  Therefore, human 
beings in being agents of the law assist in working the law pure.  To put in generally then, it 
stands to reason that a perverted conception of the good does not pollute the notion that 
individuals both inside and outside of any one system are still attempting to pursue the good, and 
that such attempts are moral in nature.  And, it follows from this that the objection of wicked 
legal systems must fail . 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has consisted of a discussion of the 3
rd
-dimension of law, which is law as it 
exists from the very first point in legal time to the ever changing present day.  It was shown that 
law has a true ambition for itself, being that it works towards working itself pure in the moral 
sense.  To do so, individuals analyze what the law is, and then by identifying deficiencies, reason 
that the law ought to be changed.  The process of changing law as it ought to be into law that is 
was called the purification process and demonstrated why the Primary Question ‘what is law’ has 
the solution that law is the constant and consistent pursuit of what law ought to be.  This 
purification process also underlies the solution to the Secondary Question, which asked ‘what is 
the relationship between law as it is and law as it ought to be’.  Finally, this chapter also 
provided an answer to the Tertiary Question (does law have a necessary connection to 
morality?), which is ‘yes’.  This answer demonstrates one half of the Paradox, being that law 
does have a necessary connection to morality.  Combined with the other half, which as 
remembered from Chapter 3 is that in the 1
st
-dimension of law, law does not have a necessary 
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connection to morality, the Paradox is made complete.  As was mentioned in the introduction, 
the solution to the Paradox is the theory of law as dimensions.  Now that this theory has been 
canvassed, the solution is apparent: law both does and does not have a necessary connection to 
morality because law exists in three separate dimensions and, depending on the dimension that 
one chooses to view the law through, one’s answer to the Tertiary Question will change.  This is 
the nature of law in 3-dimensions. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Having now delved into the foray of theoretical dispute through a theory of law as 
dimensions, the merits of my theory, like the merits of others before mine, are up for dispute.  It 
is surely not in doubt, or at least I would not be so foolish to claim, that my theory is safe from 
critique.  It is inevitable that the blows that I have ventured to volley, and/or the ideas that I have 
proffered, will be fitting of proper and poignant critique.  I do hope, however, that such critique 
will move the discipline of legal theory closer towards a unified theory of law, for it is attaining a 
unified theory that I believe achieves a true account of the nature of law.  I do admit however, 
and of course, that this is somewhat putting the cart before the horse, and thus that ambition must 
be deferred to a different project to be undertaken on a different day.  For now, it will be fitting 
to briefly summarize what has been examined over the course this project. 
 This project began with the positing of three questions, i.e. the Primary Question, the 
Secondary Question, and the Tertiary Question.  Each question was then given a preliminary 
solution.  I then went on to explain the fundamentals of legal theory and how the three questions 
came to be.  In doing so, I laid out the fundamentals of Positivism, Naturalism, and Pragmatism, 
and noted some of the contentions between them.  I then turned to establish the fundamentals of 
a theory of law as dimensions, explaining the usefulness in leaning on other fields of study and 
the importance of the basic elements of time to the theory of law as dimensions.  This discussion 
established a foundation for a discussion of law in 3-dimensions.  I thus turned to this discussion 
beginning with the 1
st
-dimension of law and how the fundamental theses of Positivism coalesced 
with the intrinsic properties of that dimension.  My analysis revealed that in the 1
st
-dimension of 
law, law exists as social and historical fact and that there is no necessary connection between law 
and morality.  This meant that the Tertiary Question, as viewed through the 1
st
-dimension of law, 
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had to be answered ‘no’, for again law had no necessary connection to morality in this 
dimension.  I then turned to discuss the 2
nd
-dimension of law and the nature of judicial 
adjudication.  My analysis in this regard demonstrated that due to the nature of legal reasoning 
and the existence of legal binds, judges decide cases through Pragmatism.  It followed that 
Pragmatism coalesced with the intrinsic properties of the 2
nd
-dimension of law.  Finally, I turned 
to discuss the 3
rd
-dimension of law where it was revealed that due to the General Goal of legal 
systems and practical reasoning, the Primary Question ‘what is law’ had to be answered with:  
law is the constant and consistent pursuit of what law ought to be.  My analysis also revealed that 
law as viewed through the 3
rd
-dimension of law is necessarily connected to morality and that 
therefore the fundamental theses of Naturalism coalesced with this dimension.  In considering 
the whole of the project, it was ultimately the case that the solutions to the three questions 
posited in the introduction were confirmed. 
 But, admittedly, my analysis did not answer every possible question, nor could have it. 
For example, one may still wonder what happens if there comes a time where it can no longer be 
the case that law is the constant and consistent pursuit of what law ought to be.  What if, from a 
higher level of abstraction the General Goal is called into question or begins to appear to be 
false?  Take for example the following hypothetical.  Suppose that tomorrow an alien race makes 
contact with Earth.  Suppose also that the alien race decides to impose ‘law’ that is devoid of any 
moral content and is actually designed to eradicate the human race.  Suppose further that the 
aliens are not imposing such laws because they are of the belief that the imposition of such laws 
is best for their own race in the long run, but instead are ambivalent as to whether it benefits 
them or not.  Suppose even further that human beings here on earth are of the view that the alien 
laws are wholly just and thus do not find a need to argue that the laws ought to be changed 
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(perhaps they are unable to comprehend that the laws will eventually eradicate them).  It may be 
argued in such a case that law cannot be said to be the constant and consistent pursuit of what 
law ought to be, for any concept of ought is moot.  In such a case then, would the alien ‘law’ be 
valid law?  Would it not be law at all for it would violate the Validity Thesis?  Would it not be 
law for it potentially violates the Sources Thesis?  Would it be law, but existing within a 4
th
-
dimension?   
While the above hypotheticals, questions, and concerns are interesting, they will need to 
be left to another project for another day.  Notwithstanding the potential merit in such issues, this 
project was concerned with providing a foundation for, and defense of, a theory of law as 
dimensions.  Many of the implications that might result from this theory have been left untested; 
however, in truth, they must be left to unravel over time, for a testing of such is again beyond the 
scope of this project.  So for now, as it appears as though I have accomplished that which I set 
out to do, it is suitable for this project to come to a close. And so it shall be closed.  
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